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sorbed roughly half of all foreign capital  by an independent regulator, however, is  gain access  to new ideas, technologies,  and
invested in Central Europe.  positively correlated with connection ca-  institutional designs.
This paper - a product of Trade, De-  pacity  and  substantially  mitigates  But globalization also entails problems
velopment Research Group - is part of a  privatization's  negative correlation with  and tensions that  must be appropriately
larger effort in the group to study regional  mainline penetration.  managed.
integration. Copies  of the paper are avail-  Reformers  are right to emphasize a com-  For one thing, global  business cycles  can
able free from the World Bank, 1818 H  binationofprivatization, competition,  and  contribute greatly to macroeconomic  vola-
Street  NW,  Washington,  DC  20433.  regulation. But researchers must explore  tility at the national level. The scope and
Please contact Lili Tabada, room MC3-  the permutations ofregulation:  What type  severity of crises in  Mexico (1994-95),
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@worldbank.org.  Policy Research Work-  How does the  regulatory  agency work?  cial  vulnerability  developing countries
ing Papers are also posted on the Web at  What is its  annual  budget? How many  face nowadays.
http://www.worldbank.org/html/decfPub-  employees does it have?  Where do the  With financial markets so highly inte-
lications/Workpapers/home.html.  The  regulators come  from?  What sort oftrain-  grated, problems are transmitted  rapidlyPolicy  Research  Working  Paper  Series  3
from one country to another.  The rapid  that the case for initiating negotiations on  Small states  do not have different per
transmission of financial shocks changes  investment policies is weak, at present.  capita  growth  rates,  with  or  without
levels of confidence  and affects exchange  Negotiating efforts that  center on fur-  controls.
rates,  interest  rates,  asset  prices,  and,  ther liberalizing market access on a non-  Their  annual  growth rates  are  more
ultimately,  output  and  employment - discriminatory basis - especially for ser-  volatile, partly  because of their  greater
with consequent social effects.  vices - are likely to be more fruitful in  volatility  in responses to terms-of-trade
Policymakers should also be concerned  terms of economic  welfare and growth.  shocks - to which they are exposed be-
about how globalization exacerbates job  Existing multilateral  instruments,  al-  cause of their  greater  openness. But on
instability  and  income disparities  both  though imperfect, are far from fully ex-  balance their  greater  openness pays off
within and  across countries. Macroeco-  ploited and provide significant opportuni-  positively in growth.
nomic and financial crises, by increasing  ties for governments opening further ac-  Easterly and Kraay do recommend  that
poverty and social tensions, can be politi-  cess to markets.  small states  diversify their risk by open-
cal destabilizing.  Hoekman  and  Saggi  conclude  that  ing up more to international  capital mar-
As the 20th century ends, the resources  priority should be given to expanding cov-  kets, although the benefits of doing  so are
of  Bretton Woods  institutions are strained  erage of  the General Agreement on Trade  still unresolved in the literature.
because of the large and complex rescue  in  Services  (GATS) before  seeking  to  In general, they conclude, small states
packages needed to deal with large-scale  negotiate  general disciplines on invest-  are  no different  from large  states  and
volatility. Development policy  agendas in  ment policies.  should  receive  the same  policy  advice  large
the era of globalization need to articulate  This paper - a product of Trade, De-  states do.
traditional  concerns with growth, stabil-  velopment Research Group - is part of a  This paper  - a product of Macroeco-
ity, and  social equity with new themes  larger effort in the group to prepare for  the  nomics and  Growth,  Development Re-
such  as  transparency  and  good gover-  next round of WTO negotiations. Copies  search Group - is part of a larger effort
nance at several levels: national, regional,  of the paper are  available free from the  in the group to study the needs of small
and global.  World  Bank, 1818 H StreetNW, Washing-  states. Copies of the paper are available
This paper - a product of the Country  ton, DC 20433.  Please contact LiliTabada,  free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street
Management  Unit,  Colombia, Ecuador,  room MC3-333, telephone 202-473-6896,  NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please con-
and Venezuela  - is part of a larger effort  fax  202-522-1159,  Internet  address  tact  Kari  Labrie,  room MC3-456, tele-
in  the  region to understand  the  links  Itabada@worldbank.org.  Policy Research  phone  202-473-1001, fax 202-522-1155,
between globalization and national devel-  Working Papers  are  also posted on the  Internet  address klabrie@worldbank.org.
opment. Copies of the paper are available  Web at  http://www.worldbank.org/htmlV  Policy Research Working Papers are also
free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street  dec/Publicationa/Workpapers/home.html.  posted  on  the  Web  at  http://www.
NW,  Washington,  DC  20433.  Please  The  authors  may  be  contacted  at  worldbank.org/html/dec/Publications/
contact Diana Cortijo, room 14-050,  tele-  bhoekman@worldbank.org  or  ksaggi  Workpapers/home.htmnl.  The authors may
phone  202-458-4005, fax 202-676-0720,  @mail.smu.edu.  (29 pages)  be contacted atweasterly@worldbank.org
Internet address dcortijo@worldbank.org.  or akraay@worldbank.org. (36 pages)
Policy Research Working Papers are also
posted  on  the  Web  at  httph/www.  2139. Small  States,  Small
worldbank.org/htmlldec/Publications/  Problems?  2140. Gender  Bias  in China,
Workpapers/home.html. The author may  the Republic  of Korea,  and  India
be  contacted  at  asolimano@worldbank.  William  Easterly  and Aart Kraay  1920-90:  Effects  of War,  Famine,
org. (14  pages)  (June 1999)  and Fertility  Decline
Small states, no differentfrom large states  Monica  Das  Gupta and Li Shuzhuo
2138.  Multilateral  Disciplines  for  in income and growth, should receive the  (June 1999)
Investment-Related  Policies  samepolicy advice large states  do. Because
oftheirgreateropenness, they  may be more  The  proportions of girls  "missing" rose
Bernard  Hoekman  and Kamal  Saggi  vulnerable to volatility in terms-of-trade  sharply  in these countries during times
(June 1999)  shocks - but their openness pays off in  of  war,  famine,  and  fertility  decline.
growth.  Resulting  shortages of  wives  improved
Is there a strong case  for developing coun-  the  treatment  of adult  women  without
tries to support the creation of a multilat-  Small states have attracted a good  deal of  reducingdiscriminationagainstdaughters
eral agreement on investment? Probably  research. Easterly and Kraay testwhether  or  increasing  women's  autonomy.  The
not. Existing agreements  offer  ample scope  microstates are any different  from other  latter goals can be reached only with fun-
for liberalizing foreign direct investment  states in income,  growth, and volatility.  damental changes  in women's  family posi-
in the area that matters most to develop-  They find that, controlling for location,  tion - changes that are taking place only
ing countries:  services.  smaller  states  are  actually richer  than  slowly.
other states  in per capita GDP. This in-
Hoekman and Saggi evaluate the poten-  come  advantage largely reflects a produc-  Kinship systems in China, the Republic  of
tial benefits ofinternational disciplines on  tivity advantage - evidence against the  Korea, and North India have similar fea-
policies toward foreign direct investment  idea that microstates are unable to exploit  tures  that  generate  discrimination
for developing countries. They conclude  increasing returns  to scale.  against  girls,  and  these countries have4  Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
some of the highest  proportions of girls  2141.  Capital  Flows,  Sector Unit,  Europe  and  Central  Asia
.missing" in the world.  Macroeconomic  Management,  Region - is part of a larger effort in the
Das Gupta  and Li document how the  and  the Financial  System:  region to  examine the  relationship  be-
excess mortality of girls was increased by  Turkey,  1989-97  tween capital flows  and economic  manage-
war, famine, and fertility decline - all of  ment. Copies of the paper  are available
which constrained household resources - Oya  Celasun,  Cevdet  Denizer,  free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street
between 1920 and 1990.  and Dong  He  NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please con-
Of the  three  countries, China  experi-  (July 1999)  tact Liana Nathaniel, room F3P-198,  tele-
enced the most crises during this  period  phone 202-458-9569, fax 202-974-4396,
(with  civil war,  invasion,  and  famine).  Between  1989-97, large private  capital  Internet  address  Inathaniel@ifc.org.
The resulting  excess mortality  of girls  flows to Turkey contributed to economic  Policy  Research Working Papers are also
in China  offset the  demographic forces  growth. Yet chronic and high fiscal defi-  posted  on  the  Web  at  http://www.
making for a surplus  of wives as overall  cits-coupled  with an inconsistentfinan-  worldbank.org/html/dec/Publications/
mortality  rates  declined. India had  the  cial sector  regulatoryframework - left the  Workpapers/home.html. The  authors may
quietest  history during this  period, and  banking system and the economy vulner-  be contacted  at  celasun@econ.umd.edu,
consequently followed the expected pat-  able to capital flow reversals  and external  cdenizer@ifc.org, or  dhe@imf.org. (58
tern  of a  growing surplus  of available  shocks.  pages)
wives.
These  changes  in  sex  ratios  had  Recent  developments  in  a  number  of
substantial  social  ramifications.  The  emerging economies have heightened in-  2142.  Adjusting  to Trade  Policy
authors  hypothesize  that  these  demo-  terest in the relationship between macro-  Reform
graphic factors:  economic  management and financial regu-
* Encouraged  the  continuation  of  lation, in an environment of open capital  Steven  J. Matusz  and David  Tarr
brideprice in China, while in India there  accounts  and  large-scale movements of  (July 1999)
was a shift to dowry.  private capital.
* Influencedtheextentandmanifesta-  Celasun, Denizer, and He analyze the  Asurveyofmore  than 50empiricalpapers
tions of violence against women.  Turkish experience with capital flows in  shows that the adjustment costs of trade
An oversupply of women is the worst  a macroeconomy  characterized by chroni-  liberalization are small relative  to the ben-
scenario for women, as  there  are fewer  cally  high  inflation  and  fiscal deficits.  efits. Moreover, manufacturing  employ-
constraints to domestic violence.  A short-  They  study the relationship between capi-  ment typically increases with trade liber-
age of women leads to better treatment  of  tal flows, macroeconomic management,  alization. The limited  data suggest that
wives, as people  become more careful not  and vulnerability in the financial system.  trade liberalization reduces poverty.
to lose a wife. However in situations  of  Their  analysis  highlights  the  impor-
shortage,  a  small proportion  of women  tance of fiscal policy in an  era  of large  Virtually all of the studies that  quantify
may be subject to new types of violence  capital flows. Fiscal imbalances contrib-  the  adjustment  costs of trade liberaliza-
such as  being kidnapped  for marriage.  uted both to real exchange rate apprecia-  tion relative to the benefits point to the
Ironically, then, higher levels of discrimi-  tion and high real interest  rates in Tur-  conclusion  that adjustment costs are small
nation against girls can help reduce vio-  key. The high interest  rates the  govern-  in relation to the benefits of trade liberal-
lence against women.  ment  must  pay on domestic debt  have  ization.
When women are in short supply, their  'become one of the key issues of Turkey's  The  explanation  for low adjustment
treatment improves. But their autonomy  macroeconomic management.  Only  by  costs is that:
can  increase  only  with  fundamental  reducing its interest  expenses can fiscal  *  These costs are typically short term
changes in their family position, changes  deficits be reduced and greater stability  and end when workers find a job, but the
that  are taking place only slowly.  be achieved.  benefits grow as the economy does.
This paper - a product of Poverty and  The Turkish banking system, in becom-  *  Unemployment doesn't last long, es-
Human  Resources,  Development  Re-  ing increasingly integrated with interna-  pecially where workers' pay was not sub-
search Group - is part of a larger effort  tional financial markets, has become  vul-  stantial in the original job.
in the group to study social institutions  nerable  to shifts in  market  confidence.  * Normal labor turnover often exceeds
and development outcomes. Copies of the  Banks  borrowed abroad  in response  to  job displacement  from trade  liberaliza-
paper are available free from the World  macroeconomic  imbalances to benefit  from  tion.
Bank, 1818  H Street NW,  Washington,  DC  high interest rates on domestic loans and  Moreover, studies  that  examine  the
20433.  Please contact Monica  Das Gupta,  government paper.  In  the  process, the  impact of trade liberalization on employ-
room MC3-579,  telephone 202-473-1983,  banks have exposed themselves to inter-  ment in developing countries find there is
fax  202-522-1153,  Internet  address  est rate risk, toforeign-exchange risk, and  little decline - and usually an increase
mdasgupta@worldbank.org.  Policy  Re-  to large credit risks.  - in manufacturing employment  in devel-
search Working  Papers are also posted on  To reduce the Turkish  economy's vul-  oping countries a year after trade liberal-
the  Web at  http:/www.worldbank.org/  nerability  to external  shocks, financial  ization, for three  reasons:
html/dec/Publications/Workpapers/  regulation mustbe strengthened simulta-  *  Developing countries  tend  to have
home.html. (34 pages)  neously with the achievement of m  comparative advantage in labor-intensive
This paper - a product of the Poverty  industries, and trade liberalization terids
Reduction and  Economic Management  to favor labor.Policy Research Working Paper Series  5
* Interindustry  shifts occur after trade  society's  savings  to firms,  exerting  corporate  2144.  Aid  Dependence  Reconsidered
liberalization,  which minimizes  the dislo-  control, and easing risk management.
cation  of factors  of production.  The  unresolved  debate  about  whether  Jean-Paul Azam, Shantayanan Devarajan,
*  In  many  industries  normal  labor  markets  or bank-based  intermediaries  are  and Stephen A. O'Connell
turnover  exceeds  dislocation  from  trade  more  effective  at providing  financial  ser-  (July 1999)
liberalization,  so downsizing,  when  neces-  vices  hampers  the  formation  of  sound
sary,  can  be accomplished  without  much  policy advice.  When foreign aid undermines  institutions,
forced unemployment.  Demirguc-Kunt  and Levine  use newly  countries  can  become  aid-dependent  -
Matusz  and Tarr  recommend  a uniform  collected data  on a cross-section  of roughly  even if donors and  recipients  have the best
tariff  to minimize  special-interest  lobby-  150 countries  to illustrate  how  financial  intentions.
ingfor  protection  since it diffuses the ben-  systems  differ around  the world. They (1)
efits  of protection.  analyze  how  the  size,  activity,  and  effi-  When  foreign  aid  undermines  institu-
This  paper  - a product  of Trade,  De-  ciency  of financial  systems  differ  across  tional  development,  aid  recipients  can
velopment  Research  Group  - is part  of a  different  per  capita  income  groups,  (2)  exhibit the symptoms  of aid "dependence"
larger  effort in the  group to examine  how  define  different  indicators  of  financial  - benefiting  from  aid in the  short  term
trade  liberalization  affects  growth  and  structure  and  identify  different  patterns  but  damaged  by it in the  long term.
poverty  reduction.  Copies ofthe  paper  are  as countries  become richer,  and (3) inves-  Azam,  Devarajan,  and  O'Connell  find
available  free from the World Bank,  1818  tigate  legal,  regulatory,  and policy deter-  that  one equilibrium  outcome  can be high
H  Street  NW,  Washington,  DC  20433.  minants  of financial  structure  after  con-  aid and weak institutions,  even when  do-
Please  contact  Lili Tabada,  room  MC3-  trolling  for per  capita  GDP.  nors  and  recipients  fully anticipate  aid's
333, telephone  202473-6896,  fax 202-522-  A clear  pattern  emerges:  effects  on institutional  development,  but
1159,  Internet  address  ltabada  *  Banks,  other  financial  intermediar-  don't  take  the drastic  steps needed  to put
@worldbank.org.  Policy  Research  Work-  ies,  and  stock  markets  all grow  and  be-  the country  on the path  to independence.
ing Papers  are  also posted  on the Web at  come more active and efficient as countries  Another  equilibrium  outcome can be low
http://www.worldbank.orglhtmlldec/Pub-  become richer. As income grows, the finan-  aid  and strong  institutions.
lications/Workpapers/home.html.  David  cial sector  develops.  Their  model  encompasses  such diverse
Tarr  may  be  contacted  at  dtarr  *  In  higher  income  countries,  stock  experiences  as those  of Tanzania  and the
@worldbank.org.  (58 pages)  markets  become more active  and efficient  Republic  of Korea.
than  banks.  Thus,  financial  systems  tend  When  the  development  community  ig-
to be more  market  based.  nores  aid's effect on institutions,  the out-
2143. Bank-Based  and Market-  *  Countries  with  a common  law tradi-  come depends  greatly on initial conditions.
Based Financial  Systems:  tion,  strong  protection  for  shareholder  Where  institutions  are  initially  weak
Cross-Country  Comparisons  rights,  good  accounting  standards,  low  (as  in many  Sub-Saharan  African  coun-
levels of corruption,  and no explicit deposit  tries  at  independence),  institutional
Asll Demirgui-Kunt and Ross Levine  insurance  tend  to be more market-based,  capacity  collapses and foreign aid eventu-
(July 1999)  even  after  controlling  for income.  ally  finances  the  whole  public  budget.
*  Countries  with a French  civil law tra-  Where  they  are  initially  stronger,  the
Financial  systems  tend to be more market-  dition, poor accounting  standards,  heavily  result  can  be  close  to  the  institutions-
based  in higher  income  countries,  where  restricted  banking  systems,  and high  in-  sensitive  equilibrium.
stock markets  also become more active and  flation  generally  tend to have underdevel-  The results  suggest that,  even for coun-
efficient  than  banks.  Financial  systems  oped financial  systems,  even after control-  tries  with  similar  per capita  incomes,  the
also  tend  to be more  market-based,  even  ling for income.  foreign aid strategy  should be designed  to
after controlling  for  income,  in countries  This  paper  - a  product  of  Finance,  suit  the  country's  institutional  capacity.
with  a common  law tradition,  strong pro-  Development  Research  Group  - is part  In  some  cases  a short-term  reduction  in
tection ofshareholder  rights, good account-  of a larger  effort in the  group to study  the  aid  may  increase  a country's  chances  of
ing  standards,  low  levels  of corruption,  impact  of financial  structure  on economic  graduating  from  aid.
and  no explicit  deposit  insurance.  development.  Copies  of  the  paper  are  This  paper  - a product  of Public  Eco-
available  free from the World Bank,  1818  nomics, Development  Research  Group  -
What  are the relative  advantages  and dis-  H  Street  NW,  Washington,  DC  20433.  is part  of a larger  effort  in the  group  to
advantages  of bank-based  financial  sys-  Please  contact  Kari  Labrie,  room  MC3-  study  the effects of foreign aid on the pub-
tems  (as  in  Germany  and  Japan)  and  456, telephone  202-473-1001, fax 202-522-  lic sector.  Copies  of the  paper  are  avail-
market-based  financial  systems  (as  in  1155,  Internet  address  klabrie  able  free  from  the  World  Bank,  1818  H
England  and the  United  States).  Does fi-  @worldbank.org.  Policy  Research  Work-  Street  NW,  Washington,  DC  20433.
nancial  structure  matter?  ing Papers  are  also posted  on the Web at  Please  contact  Hedy  Sladovich,  room
In  bank-based  systems  banks  play  a  http'J/www.worldbank.org/html/decfPub-  MC2-609,  telephone  202-473-7698,  fax
leadingrole  in mobilizing savings,  allocat-  lications/Workpapers/home.html.  The au-  202-522-1154,  Internet  address
ing  capital,  overseeing  the  investment  thors may be contacted  at ademirguckunt  hsladovich@worldbank.org.  Policy  Re-
decisions  of corporate  managers,  and pro-  @worldbank.org  or  rlevine@csom.umn.  search Working  Papers  are also posted  on
viding  risk  management  vehicles.  edu.  (68 pages)  the  Web  at  httpl/www.worldbank.org/
In market-based  systems  securities mar-  html/dec/Publications/Workpapers/
kets share center stage with banks in getting  home.html.  The authors  may be contacted6  Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
atjean-paul.azamuniv-tlse1.fr,sdevarajan  Mekuria,  room  MC4-328,  telephone  free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street
@worldbank.org,  orsoconnel  @swarthmore.  202-458-2756,  fax 202-522-1158,  Internet  NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please con-
edu. (14 pages)  address bmekuria@worldbank.org.  Policy  tact  Kari  Labrie, room  MC3-456, tele-
Research Working  Papers are also posted  phone  202-473-1001, fax 202-522-1155,
on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/  Internet address klabrie@worldbank.org.
2145. Assessing the Impact  html/dec/Publications/Workpapers/  Policy  Research Working Papers are also
of Micro-credit  on Poverty  home.html. The author may be contacted  posted  on  the  Web  at  http://www.
and Vulnerability in Bangladesh  at hzaman@worldbank.org. (49 pages)  worldbank.orglhtml/dec/Publications/
Workpapers/home.html.  The authors may
Hassan  Zaman  be  contacted  at  tbeck@worldbank.org,
(July  1999)  2146.  A New Database  ademirguckunt@worldbank.org,  or rlevine
on Financial Development  @csom.umn.edu.  (63 pages).
While micro-credit  interventions can play  and Structure
an important role in reducing vulnerabil-
ity through a number of channels, a sig-  Thorsten  Beck,  Asll Demirguc-Kunt,  2147. Developing Country
nificant impact  on poverty reduction is  and Ross  Levine  Goals and Strategies
achieved  under more  restrictiye  conditions.  (July  1999)  for the Millennium Round
These conditions revolve around whether
the  borrower has crossed a cumulative  This new database of indicators of finan-  Constantine  Michalopoulos
loan threshold and on howpoor the house-  cial  development and  structure  across  (July 1999)
hold is to start with.  countries and over time unites a range of
indicators that measure the size, activity,  Strategies  developing countries  should
Zaman  examines  the  extent  to  which  and efficiency offinancial  intermediaries  adopt in the  next series of multilateral
micro-credit reduces poverty and vulner-  and markets.  negotiations under the World Trade Orga-
ability through a case study of BRAC,  one  nization (WTO).
of the largest providers of micro-credit to  Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine intro-
the poor in Bangladesh. Household con-  duce a new database of indicators of  finan-  Many developing countries have been re-
sumption data collected  from 1,072  house-  cial  development  and  structure  across  luctant to participate in multilateral trade
holds is used to show that the largest ef-  countries and over time.  negotiations except for those on agricul-
fect on poverty arises when a moderate-  This database is unique in that it unites  ture and services, topics mandated under
poor BRAC loanee  borrows more  that  a variety of indicators  that  measure the  previous  World  Trade  Organization
10,000  taka (US$200)  incumulative loans.  size, activity, and efficiency of financial  (WTO) decisions. Michalopoulos argues
Different  control groups and  estimation  intermediaries  and markets.  that developing countries can gain signifi-
techniques  are  used  to  illustrate  this  It improves on previous efforts by pre-  cant benefits from a broader WTO  Millen-
point.  senting data on the public share of com-  nium Round of negotiations but must de-
Zaman discusses several ways by which  mercial banks, by introducing indicators  velop strategies for participating in it.
membership  in  micro-credit  programs  of the size and activity of nonbank finan-  Different groups of countries will have
reduces vulnerability  - by  smoothing  cial institutions,  and by presenting mea-  different interests,  but developing coun-
consumption, building assets, providing  sures of the size of bond and primary eq-  tries as a group may want to include ad-
emergency assistance during natural  di-  uity markets.  ditional issues in the  new Round, espe-
sasters,  and contributing  to female em-  The compiled data permit the construc-  cially industrial  tariffs and trade-related
powerment. The reduction in female vul-  tion of financial  structure  indicators  to  aspects of intellectual  property rights.
nerability in a patriarchal  society is illus-  measure whether, for example, a country's  It may also be to their advantage to in-
trated using 16 female empowerment in-  banks are larger, more active, and more  clude discussions on trade-related  envi-
dicators  developed from data  on  1,568  efficient than  its  stock markets.  These  ronmental  issues  and  government pro-
women. The results  suggest that  micro-  indicators can then be used to investigate  curement, if they obtain the institutional
credit's  greatest  impact is on the  set of  the empirical link between the legal, regu-  support they need to meet their commit-
indicators relating to female control over  latory, and policy environment and indi-  ments under any new agreements.
assets and knowledge of social issues.  cators of financial structure. They  can also  Other topics should be resisted because
The  author  also  argues  that  micro-  be used to analyze the implications of fi-  they are premature or counterproductive
credit's impact on poverty  and vulnerabil-  nancial structure  for economic  growth.  or do not promise net benefits for most
ity can be strengthened  if credit is pro-  Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and  Levine de-  developing countries.
videdjointly with other financial (savings  scribe the sources and construction of,  and  The new Round should be a single un-
and  insurance)  and  nonfinancial  (legal  the intuition behind, different indicators  dertaking,  to maximize tradeoffs across
education, food relief) interventions.  and present descriptive statistics.  issues and for political economy  reasons:
This paper is a product of the Office  of  This paper  - a  product  of Finance,  to permit liberalizing forces everywhere
the  Senior  Vice  President  and  Chief  Development Research Group - is part  to exert pressure  on governments to lib-
Economist,  Development  Economics.  Cop-  of a broader effort in the group to under-  eralize world trade. But there should not
ies ofthe paper are available free from the  stand the determinants of financial struc-  be too many issues, as that  would strain
World  Bank, 1818  H Street NW,  Washing-  ture and its importance to economic  devel-  the capacities of the poorer and least de-
ton, DC 20433. Please contact Bezawork  opment. Copies  of the paper are available  veloped economies.Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series  7
In a new WTO Round, developing coun-  social capital  along  six dimensions:  den-  income gains  to families  of workers  par-
tries  should  be prepared  to exchange  lib-  sity ofmemberships,  internal  heterogene-  ticipating  in  an  Argentinian  workfare
eralizing  trade  concessions  on a most-fa-  ity of associations  (by age, gender,  educa-  program.  The methods  they  propose  are
vored-nation  basis. Liberalization  oftheir  tion,  religion,  and so on), meeting  atten-  feasible for evaluating  safety net interven-
own trade in exchange for improved  access  dance,  active  participation  in  decision-  tions  in  settings  in  which  many  other
to the markets  of their  trading  partners,  making,  payment  of dues, and community  methods are not feasible. The average gain
most of which are other  developing  coun-  orientation.  is about  half the gross  wage.
tries,  is the onlyway  to maximize  benefits  The strongest  effects come from:  Even  allowing  for forgone  income,  the
from  multilateral  trade  negotiations.  Ef-  * Number  of memberships.  Each addi-  distribution  of gains is decidedly pro-poor.
forts  to  obtain  special  and  differential  tional membership  (an average 20 percent  More than  halfthe  beneficiaries  are in the
treatment  should  focus  on  establishing  increase)  raises  per  capita  household  poorest  decile  nationally  and 80 percent
realistic  transition  periods  and technical  spending  1.5 percent.  of them  are in the poorest  quintile  - re-
assistance  to address  constraints  on their  *  Internal  heterogeneity.  An increase  flecting  the  self-targeting  feature  of the
institutional  capacity.  of 20 percent  in the  heterogeneity  index  program  design.
This  paper  - a product  of Trade,  De-  correlates with 3.3 percent more spending.  Average  gains  for men  and women  are
velopment  Research  Group-is  part of a  * Active participation  in decision-mak-  similar,  but  gains  are higher  for younger
larger  effort  in the  group  to identify  op-  ing. An increase  of 20 percent  in the par-  workers.
portunities  for developing countries  in the  ticipation  index  correlates  with  3.2 per-  Women's  greater  participation  would
WTO  2000  negotiations.  Copies  of the  cent more spending.  not  enhance  average  income  gains,  and
paper  are  available  free  from the  World  Grootaert  also  estimates  structural  the distribution  of gains would worsen.
Bank, 1818HStreetNW,  Washington,  DC  equations  and uses instrumental  variable  Greater  participation  by  the  young
20433.  Please  contact  Lili Tabada,  room  estimation  and historical  data  to address  would raise  average  gains but would also
MC3-333,  telephone  202 473-6896,  fax  the possible endogeneity  ofthe  social capi-  worsen  the distribution.
202-522-1159,  Internet  address  Itabada  tal variable  and to demonstrate  that  the  This paper  - a product  of Poverty  and
@worldbank.org.  Policy Research  Work-  causalityruns  from social capitaltohouse-  Human  Resources,  Development  Re-
ing  Papers  are  also posted  on the  Web at  hold welfare.  search  Group  - is part  of a larger  effort
httpJ/www.worldbank.orgthtml/dec/Publi-  This  paper  - a product  of the  Social  in the group to improve methods  for evalu-
cations/Workpapers/home.html.  The  au-  Development  Department  - is part  of a  ating  the  poverty  impact  of Bank-sup-
thor  may be contacted  at  cmichalopoulos  larger  effort in the  department  to assess  ported  programs.  Copies of the  paper  are
C@worldbank.org.  (41 pages)  empirically  the role of local institutions  in  available  free from the World Bank,  1818
the  delivery  of services  and poverty  alle-  H  Street  NW,  Washington,  DC  20433.
viation.  Copies of the  paper  are available  Please  contact  Patricia  Sader,  telephone
2148.  Social  Capital,  Household  free from the World Bank,  1818 H Street  202-473-3902, fax 202-522-1153,  Internet
Welfare, and  Poverty  in  NW, Washington,  DC 20433.  Please  con-  address  psader@worldbank.org.  Policy
Indonesia  tact Gracie Ochieng, room MC5-410,  tele-  Research Working  Papers are also posted
phone  202-473-1123,  fax  202-522-3247,  on the Web athttp:/www.worldbank.org/
Christiaan Grootaert  Internet  address  gochieng@worldbank.  html/dec/Publications/Workpapers/
(July 1999)  org. Policy Research  Working Papers  are  home.html.  The authors  maybe  contacted
also posted on the Web at  http:/hvww.  at  balan@isid.ac.in  or  mravallion
It pays  for poor households  to participate  worldbank.org/html/dec/Publications/  @worldbank.org.  (32 pages)
actively  in local associations.  At  low  in-  Workpapers/home.html.  The author  may
comes,  the  returns  to social  capital  are  be  contacted  at  cgrootaert@worldbank.
higher  than  returns  to human  capital.  At  org. (79 pages)  2150. Who  Wants  to Redistribute?
higher  incomes,  the reverse is true.  Russia's  Tunnel  Effect  in the 1990s
Grootaert  empirically  estimates  how  so-  2149. Income  Gains  to the Poor  Martin Ravallion and Michael Lokshin
cial capital  affects household  welfare  and  from  Workfare:  Estimates  for  (July 1999)
poverty in Indonesia.  His focus: household  Argentina's  Trabajar  Program
memberships  in  local  associations,  an  Attitudes  toward  redistribution  of wealth
aspect of social capital  especially relevant  Jyotsna Jalan and Martin Ravallion  in  Russia  tend  to reflect  expectations  of
to  daily  household  decisions  that  affect  (July 1999)  future  mobility,  in  both  directions.  Few
welfare  and consumption.  Russians  expected rising living  standards
The data  suggest  that  households  with  A  workfare  program  was  introduced  in  in the 1990s, and  most expected a decline
higher  social  capital  spend  more  per  response to high unemployment  in Argen-  in living  standards,  so there  was strong
capita.  They also have  more assets,  more  tina. An ex-post evaluation  using  match-  demand  for  redistribution,  even  among
savings,  and better  access to credit.  ing  methods  indicates  that  the program  those currently  well off  but fearful  of the
To estimate  how social capital  contrib-  generated  sizable net income gains  to gen-  future.
utes to household welfare, Grootaert uses  erally poor  participants.
a reduced-form  model of household  wel-  It  seems natural  to expect  the rich to op-
fare, which controls for relevant  household  Jalan  and Ravallion  use propensity-score  pose policies to redistribute  income  from
and location characteristics.  He measures  matching  methods  to  estimate  the  net  the rich to the poor, and the poor to favor8  Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
such  policies. But this  may be too simple  Ravallion may be contacted  at mravallion  This paper  - a product  of Governance,
a  model,  say  Ravallion  and  Lokshin.  Cworldbank.org.  (26 pages)  Regulation,  and  Finance,  World  Bank
Expectations  of future  welfare  may come  Institute,  - is part  of a larger  effort in
into play.  Well-off people on a downward  the institute  to increase  understanding  of
trajectory  may well favor such policies and  2151.  A Few  Things  Transport  infrastructure  regulation.  Copies  of the
poor  people  on  a  rising  trajectory  may  Regulators  Should  Know  About  paper  are  available  free from  the  World
not.  Risk  and  the  Cost  of Capital  Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington,  DC
This resistance  ofupwardly  mobile poor  20433.  Please  contact  Gabriela  Chenet-
people to lasting  redistribution  is analo-  Ian Alexander, Antonio Estache,  Smith,  room G2-148, telephone  202-473-
gous  to  Hirshman's  'tunnel  effect,"  as  and Adele Oliveri  6370, fax 202-334-8350, Internet  address
applied to traffic stuck on a congested two-  (July 1999)  gchenet@worldbank.org.  Policy Research
lane  road in a tunnel:  People's  spirits  lift  Working  Papers  are  also  posted  on the
when  traffic  starts  moving  again;  but  A  methodology  for measuring  the cost of  Web at  http://www.worldbank.orglhtml1
when  another  lane  starts  moving  and  capital,  calculating  the measure  of mar-  dec/Publications/Workpapers/home.html.
theirs  doesn't,  they  might  grow  furious  ket risk, and estimating  the impact ofvari-  Antonio  Estache  may  be  contacted  at
and want  to correct things  by crossing  the  ous regulatory  regimes  on market  risk  in  aestache@worldbank.org.  (17 pages)
double  line separating  the two lanes.  the transport  sector.
Using  Russia  in the  1990s as  the  set-
ting, Ravallion  and Lokshin  analyze  why  In reviewing  contracts,  establishing  price  2152.  Comparing  the Performance
some people favor governmental  redistri-  limits,  or arbitrating  conflicts, regulatory  of  Public  and  Private  Water
bution  and  others  do  not  and  whether  agencies  and policy advisors  face signifi-  Companies  in the  Asia  and  Pacific
there  is a "tunnel  effect." They find  that:  cant information  asymmetry  in determin-  Region:  What  a Stochastic  Costs
* Some  72 percent  of the  7,000 adults  ing the appropriate  allowed rate  of return,  Frontier  Shows
surveyed  in October  1996 favor  govern-  or discount  rate.  The information  gap is
ment  action to reduce  incomes ofthe  rich.  especially  important  in determining  the  Antonio Estache and Martin A. Rossi
But the other 28 percent were not only the  degree  of market  risk  - often  a critical  (July 1999)
currently  "rich."  component of the cost of capital demanded
* About 85 percent  ofthose  in the poor-  by operators.  Efficiency indicators  can be useful  to regu-
est  consumption  decile  favor redistribu-  Alexander,  Estache,  and  Oliveri  con-  lators assessing the efficiency of an opera-
tion.  But  among  those  who  expect  their  sider  various  methodological  problems  in  tion and the wedge between tariffand  mini-
welfare  to decline, support  for redistribu-  the  transport  sector  in establishing  the  mum  costs. They allow regulators to control
tion  is  high,  even  among  the  currently  link  between  regulatory  regime  and  de-  forfactors over which the operators have no
"rich." There is little  support  for redistri-  gree  of market  risk.  control (such as diversity  of water sources,
bution  among  the  well-off who  expect  to  The results  ofquantitative  studies  con-  or water quality or user characteristics).
become  even  better  off.  Resistance  is  firm that  even for the transport  sector -
greatest  among those on a rising  consump-  where there  is intermodal  competition and  Estache  and Rossi estimate  a stochastic
tion path  who expect  it to continue.  where  contracts  are  often  shorter  and  costs frontier  for a sample  of Asian  and
* Women  tend  to favor redistribution  regulatory  decisions may be less pressing  Pacific water  companies,  comparing  the
more  than  men.  than  for utilities  - the  choice of regula-  performance  ofpublic  and privatized  com-
* Those  who  favor  redistribution  tory  regime  greatly  affects the  degree  of  panies  based  on detailed  firm-specific  in-
include  people  who  voted  communist  market  risk  a  company  faces.  This  has  formation  published  by the  Asian Devel-
and  people  who are  vulnerable:  the  old,  important  implications  for  regulatory  opment  Bank in  1997.
women,  poorly  educated  adults,  people  agencies  and actions.  They  find  private  operators  of water
who  live  in  rural  areas,  people  who  When  a regulatory  agency  undertakes  companies  to be more efficient  than  pub-
expect to lose their  jobs, and  people who  a price review,  or when  issues  arise about  lic operators.  Costs in concessioned  com-
do not think  the  government  cares  about  concession  contracts,  it is important  that  panies tend  to be significantly  lower than
them.  regulators  assess  correctly  the  required  those  in public  companies.
This  paper  - a product  Poverty  and  rate  of return  and  cost  of capital.  They  Estache  and Rossi compare  the ranking
Human  Resources,  Development  Re-  must also assess correctly the level ofrisk,  of these  companies  by  efficiency perfor-
search  Group  - is part  of a larger  effort  which  affects the required  rate  of return  mance  (obtained  from  econometric  esti-
in the group  to understand  the  political  and the cost of capital.  mates)  with  rankings  by more  standard
economy ofredistributive  policies. Copies  Most regulators  in developing countries  qualitative  and  productivity  indicators
of the  paper  are  available  free from  the  have a problem: the regulated  companies  typically  used to assess  performance.
World Bank, 18181H  Street NW, Washing-  are  unquoted  or  undertake  many  Theyshowthatrankingsbasedonstandard
ton,  DC 20433.  Please  contact  Patricia  activities  for  a  range  of  industries  indicators are not always very consistent
Sader,  telephone  202473-3902,  fax  and  even sectors.  For them  this  method-  Productivity indicators  recognize simple
202-522-1153,  Internet  address  psader  ology for measuring  the cost ofcapital,  cal-  input-output  relations,  such as the number
@aworldbank.org. Policy Research  Work-  culating  the measure  of market  risk,  and  of workers  per client  or connection.  Fron-
ing Papers  are also posted  on the Web at  estimating  the impact  of various  regula-  tiers recognAize  the more complex nature  of
http://www.worldbank.orgfhtmlldec/Pub-  tory  regimes  on  market  risk  may  be  interactions  between  inputs  and outputs.
lications/Workpapers/home.html.  Martin  useful.  Cost fontiers  show the costs as a functionPolicy  Research  Working  Paper  Series  9
of the level of output (or outputs) and the  Ms. Speedy Analyst's on-the-job train-  industry of origin (including intrasectoral
prices of inputs,  and are generally more  ing in how to assess the impact of a social  moves that  would be  considered inter-
useful to regulators assessing the wedge  program  provides  the  vehicle through  sectoral if there were more sectoral disag-
betweentariff and minimum costs.  Produc-  which this paper explains:  gregation). The degree of similarity be-
tion  frontiers  reveal  technical  relations  * Methods of evaluating a program's  tween two industries is measured in sev-
between firms' inputs  and outputs  and  impact-randomizing,  matching, reflex-  eral ways, all of them based on the input-
provide  ausefulbackupwhencostfrontiers  ive comparisons,  double difference  (or"dif-  output flows across industries.  Workers
are difficult  to assess for lack of data.  ference in difference") methods, and  in-  are more likely to move from industry i to
This paper - a product of Governance,  strumental  variables methods.  industryj  if i supplies a large share ofjs
Regulation and Finance, World Bank In-  *  The types  of data  used for impact  inputs, receives a large share of its inputs
stitute  - is part of a larger  effort in the  evaluation,  typical  problems  with  and  fromj, or uses many of the same inputs.
institute to increase understanding of in-  uses of data, control  variables, instrumen-  *  Moves  to more  similar industries pro-
frastructure  regulation. Copies of the pa-  tal variables, regressions, and so on.  duce larger wage gains. This is especially
per  are  available  free from the  World  *  How to form and match comparison  true  when the  industries'  similarity  is
Bank, 1818  H Street NW,  Washington,  DC  groups.  based on their  using many  of the  same
20433. Please contact Gabriela Chenet-  *  Sources of bias.  inputs.  This may be partly  because the
Smith, room G2-148, telephone 202-473-  * The value of baseline surveys.  close  proximity ofindustries, occupations,
6370, fax 202-334-8350,  Internet address  *  Measures of poverty (headcount in-  and individuals provides an environment
gchenet@worldbank.org.  Policy  Research  dex, poverty gap index, and squared pov-  in which ideas flow quickly from person
Working Papers are  also posted on the  erty gap).  to person.
Web at  http://www.worldbank.orglhtmll  *  How to compare poverty with  and  *  Gains  are more likely to accrue to
dec/Publications/Workpapers/home.html.  without the program.  industries as a result of labor mobility.
Antonio  Estache  may  be  contacted  at  This paper - a product of Poverty and  This paper - a product of Public Eco-
aestache@worldbank.org. (26 pages)  Human  Resources,  Development  Re-  nomics, Development Research Group -
search Group - is part of a larger effort  is part of a larger  effort in the  group to
in the  group to provide useful training  analyze the potential need for public sup-
2153.  The Mystery of the Vanishing  tools for Bank staff. Copies of the paper  port of industrial  development. Copies  of
Benefits: Ms. Speedy Analyst's  are available free from the World Bank,  the  paper  are  available  free from  the
Introduction  to Evaluation  1818  H  Street  NW,  Washington,  DC  World  Bank, 1818 H Street NW,  Washing-
20433.  Please  contact  Patricia  Sader,  ton,  DC  20433.  Please  contact  Hedy
Martin Ravallion  room MC4-773,  telephone 202-473-3902,  Sladovich,  room  MC2-609,  telephone
(July  1999)  fax  202-522-1153,  Internet  address  202-473-7698,  fax 202-522-1154,  Internet
psader@worldbank.org. Policy Research  address  hsladovich@worldbank.org.
Thisentertainingintroductiontotheconcepts  Working Papers  are  also posted on the  Policy  Research Working Papers are also
and methods ofimpact  evaluation - as seen  Web at http:l/www.worldbank.org/html/  posted  on  the  Web  at  http:/lwww.
through  the eyes of Ms. Speedy Analyst  - dec/Publications/Workpapers/home.html.  worldbank.org/html/dec/Publications/
assumes  readers  are familiar with basic  sta-  The  author  may  be  contacted  at  Workpapers/home.html.  Howard  Pack
tisticsup  to regression  analysis  (as covered in  mravallion@worldbank.org.  (40 pages)  may be contacted at  hpack@worldbank.
an introductory  text on econometrics).  org. (24  pages)
The setting for this good-natured training  2154. Inter-industry  Labor
guide  for  impact  evaluation  is the fictional  Mobility  in Taiwan,  China  2155.  Lending  Booms,  Reserves,
developing  country  Labas.  Twelve  months  and  the Sustainability  of  Short-
ago  the  government  introduced  an  Howard  Pack  and Christina  Paxson  Term Debt: Inferences  from the
antipoverty program in Northwest Labas  (August  1999)  Pricing of Syndicated Bank Loans
with support from the World Bank. The
program aims to provide cash transfers  The  proximity  of  industries  is  strongly  Barry Eichengreen  and Ashoka  Mody
to  poor  families  with  school-age  children.  related to inter-industry  labor mobility,  (August  1999)
To be  eligible to  receive the  transfer,  and there is some evidence that workers
households  must have  observable  charac-  who move to closely similar industries re-  International banksprovide more credit to
teristics  that  suggest they  are  poor.  ceive  higher wages.  Knowledge  is transmit-  smaller borrowers  (about whom informa-
To continue receiving the  transfer,  they  ted more easily when industries  operate,  tion is least complete) than bond markets
must keep their children  in school  until  and  workers  work,  in  close physical  do. High external short-term debt can co-
18 years of age. The program is called  proximity.  exist with rapidgrowthforextendedperi-
PROSCOL.  ods. But overdependence on such debt is
The  government  wants  to  assess  Do  flexible  labor  markets  lubricate  risky, because  it is likely to unravel if  per-
PROSCOL's impact  on poverty, to help  growth? Using data from Taiwan, China,  ceptions  of sustainability  shift.
decide  whether the program should be ex-  to analyze the effects  of labor market flex-
panded or dropped. The Finance Minister  ibility, Pack and Paxson find that:  Academics pay little attention to interna-
asks the undersecretary, and the  under-  *  Workers are more likely to move to  tional bank lending, focusing instead on
secretary calls in Ms. Speedy Analyst.  industries that tend to be similar to their  rapidly growing  market segments such as10  Policy Research Working Paper Series
the intemational bond market and deriva-  org. Policy  Research Working Papers are  liberalized since the mid-1980s, these re-
tive credit instruments.  Eichengreen and  also posted on  the  Web at  http:/A/www.  sults suggest that their trade performance
Mody argue for paying more attention  to  worldbank.org/html/dec/Publications/  has been influenced more by competitive-
international  bank lending.  Workpapers/home.html.  Ashoka  Mody  ness than  by trade  policy.
Why? Three reasons.  may be contacted at amody@worldbank.  This paper - a product of Trade, De-
First, the  syndicated bank loan is one  org. (43 pages)  velopment Research Group-is  part of a
of  the workhorses of international capital  larger effort in the group to study the ef-
markets.  fects of  regional integration. Copies of  the
Second, international  bank lending is  2156.  How  Has  Regionalism  paper are  available free from the World
especially important  for private-sector  in the 1990s  Affected  Trade?  Bank, 1818  H Street NW,  Washington,  DC
borrowers,  whose  participation in interna-  20433. Please contact Lili Tabada, room
tional capital markets will grow as capi-  Isidro  Soloaga  and L. Alan  Winters  MC3-333, telephone  202-473-6896, fax
tal markets are liberalized and state en-  (August  1999)  202-522-1159, Internet  address  Itabada
terprises privatized. Sovereigns and other  @worldbank.org. Policy Research Work-
governmental borrowers rely more on the  The results of a modified gravity  model  ing Papers are also posted on the Web at
bond market, while private borrowers are  suggest that the 'new wave"of regionalism  http://www.worldbank.org/html/dec/Pub-
disproportionately important to the mar-  has not boosted  intra-bloc trading signifi-  lications/Workpapers/home.html.  The
ket in international  bank loans.  cantly.  Trade  liberalization  in  Latin  authors  may  be  contacted  at  isoloaga
Private-sector  borrowers  establish long-  America did have a positive impact on the  @worldbank.org or  l.a.winters@sussex.
term relationships with banks to resolve  imports  of  bloc  members,  although  ac.uk. (26 pages)
information problems. Eichengreen and  MERCOSUR's exports didpoorly over the
Mody find that international  banks pro-  mid-1990s.
vide  more credit  to smaller  borrowers  2157.  How  Regional  Blocs  Affect
(about whom information  is least  com-  Soloaga  and  Winters  apply  a  gravity  Excluded  Countries:  The  Price
plete) than bond  markets do. Bank finance  model to data on annual nonfuel imports  Effects  of MERCOSUR
dominates that  segment of international  for 58 countries for the years 1980-96, to
financial markets with the greatest infor-  quantify the effects on trade  of recently  Won  Chang  and L. Alan  Winters
mation asymmetry.  created or  revamped  preferential  trade  (August  1999)
Third,  spreads  on  syndicated  bank  agreements (PTAs).
loans  show  much  less  variation  than  They modify  the usual gravity equation  Price  data on exports to Brazil from coun-
spreads on international bonds. Are bank  to identify the separate effects of PTAs  on  tries excluded from  MERCOSUR  show
lenders  properly  pricing  country  and  intra-bloc trade, members'total  imports,  that preferential trading agreements hurt
credit risk? Does spread compression on  and members'total exports. They also for-  nonmember countries by compelling them
syndicated bank loans suggest excessive  mally test the significance of changes in  to reduce their prices to meet competition
moral  hazard  in  international  bank  the estimated  coefficients  before and  af-  from suppliers within the regional  trading
lending?  ter the blocs' formation.  bloc.
Eichengreen  and  Mody warn  against  Their estimates give no indication that
overdependence on high levels of domes-  the  "new wave" of regionalism boosted  The welfare effects of  preferential trading
tic debt. While growth in domestic debt  intra-bloc trade significantly.  agreements  are  most  directly linked to
reflects improved intermediation between  They  found convincing  evidence  of  trade  changes  in trade  prices  - that  is, the
savers and investors, rapid increases to  diversion only  forthe European Union and  terms of trade.
high levels are viewed as unsustainable  the European Free Trade Association.  For  Chang and Winters use a simple strate-
and raise the cost of international borrow-  the same blocs they also observed 'export  gic pricing game in segmented markets to
ing.  They  find  evidence  of  growing  diversion,"  which would be consistent with  measure the effects  of MERCOSUR  on the
bullishness among bank  lenders to East  these blocs'  imposing a welfare cost on the  pricing of "nonmember" exports to the re-
Asia in the first half of the  1990s, which  rest of the world.  gional trading bloc.  Working  with detailed
could  reflect moral hazard, but the jury is  Trade  liberalization  efforts  in  Latin  data on unit values and tariffs, they find
still out on that issue. High external short-  America have had a positive  impact on the  that the creation of MERCOSUR  is associ-
term debt can coexist with rapid growth  imports of bloc  members (Andean Group,  ated with significant declines in the prices
for extended periods but is likely to un-  Central American Common  Market, Latin  of nonmembers' exports to the bloc.  These
ravel if perceptions of sustainability shift.  American  Integration  Association, and  can be explained largely by tariff prefer-
This paper-a  product of the Develop-  MERCOSUR).  Increasing propensities to  ences offered  to a country's partners.
ment Prospects Group-is  part of  a larger  export generally accompanied increasing  Focusing on the  Brazilian market  (by
effort  in the group to study the microstruc-  propensities  to import,  suggesting that  far the largest in MERCOSUR),  they show
ture  of  international  capital  markets,  general trade liberalization had a strong  that nonmembers'export  prices to Brazil
Copies  of the paper are available free from  effect. The exception was MERCOSUR,  respond  to  both  most-favorable-nation
the  World Bank,  1818 H  Street  NW,  for which import and export propensities  and preferential  tariffs. Preferential tar-
Washington, DC 20433. Please contact  displayed opposite movements, with ex-  iffs induce reductions in nonmember ex-
Sydnella Kpundeh, room MC6-767, tele-  ports  performing worse  than  expected  port prices.
phone 202-473-9591, fax 202-522-2578,  over  the  mid-1990s.  Although  This paper - a product of Trade, tIe-
Internet  address skpundeh@worldbank.  MERCOSUR  members have undoubtedly  velopment Research Group - is part of aPolicy  Research  Working  Paper  Series  II
larger effort in the group to understand  Domestic banks that focused on mort-  Politicians whose  provinces  were in dire
the effects  of regional integration. Copies  gage lending  - an  area foreign banks  fiscal straits, their banks losing money at
of the paper are available free from the  entered aggressively in the mid-1990s  - a fast rate, were most willing to seize op-
World  Bank, 1818  H Street NW,  Washing-  experienced falling net margins and in-  portunities to privatize, even  though over-
ton, DC 20433.  Please  contact Lili Tabada,  creasing overhead.  staffed provincial banks were harder to
room MC3-333,  telephone 202-473-6896,  There were many domestic bank fail-  privatize. Deposit  loss and liquidity prob-
fax  202-522-1159,  Internet  address  ures  in  the  mid-1990s, but  the  banks  lems associated with the  Tequila crisis
Itabada@worldbank.org.  Policy  Research  that failed were not heavily concentrated  made privatization more  likely.
Working Papers are  also posted on the  in the types of lending favored by foreign  The  right political  situation is necessary
Web at http://www.worldbank.org/html/  banks.  but not sufficient to ensure good privati-
dec/Publications/Workpaperslhome.html.  This paper  -a  product of Regulation  zations. First, one must find a buyer, and
The authors may be contacted at wchang  and  Competition  Policy and  Finance,  Argentina's  provincial banks  were  the
@worldbank.org or  l.a.winters@sussex.  Development Research Group - is part  least attractive in the banking sector. So
ac.uk. (57 pages)  of a larger effort in the group to investi-  the provinces settled for purchasers that
gate  the  determinants  of  structural  were not first-tier banks. Many of them
change in developing countries' banking  were small wholesale banks  that had to
2158.  The  Effect  of Foreign  Entry  sectors. Copies of the paper are available  make  the  difficult  transition  to  retail
on Argentina's  Domestic  Banking  free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street  banking.
Sector  NW, Washington,  DC  20433.  Please  Three important concessions  were made
contact  Paulina  Sintim-Aboagye, room  to  purchasers: contracts to  provide  post-
George  R. G.  Clarke,  Robert  Cull,  MC3-422, telephone  202-473-8526, fax  privatization  services  to the provinces,  port-
Laura D'Amato,  and Andrea  Molinari  202-522-1155,  Internet  address  folio  guarantees,  and the assumption  of only
(August  1999)  psintimaboagye@worldbank.org. Policy  "good"assets.Inreturn,provincialpoliticians
Research Working  Papers are also posted  were granted restrictions on branch clos-
Foreign banks entering Argentina's  do-  onthe Web  athttp://www.worldbank.orgl  ings and layoffs  of bank employees.
mestic banking  sector  in the mid- 1990s  did  html/dec/PublicationsfWorkpapers/  Both  types  of  accommodation were
not  merely follow their clients  abroad.  home.html. The  authors maybe contacted  costly  to the purchasers and the provinces.
They exerted competitive  pressure on do-  at  gclarke@worldbank.org,  rcull  These transactions  probably could not
mestic Argentine banks, especially those  @worldbank.org, amolinari@worldbank.  have been completed without long-term
focused on mortgage lending or manufac-  org,  or  investig.monetar@bcra.gov.ar  loans from the Fondo  Fiduciario.
turing. Overhead,  profitability, and inter-  (attention: Laura D'Amato).  (30 pages)  Were the Fondo Fiduciario loan funds
est margins were affected least in domes-  put to good use? Did privatization leave
tic banksfocused on consumer  lending, an  provincial  banking on a sounder footing?
area in  which foreign investors showed  2159. Provincial  Bank  Privatization  Initialindicationsarethatthesituationhas
little interest.  in Argentina  The  Why,  How,  and  improved  in most provinces.  And the pryv-
"So  What?"  incesexperiencingpost-privatizationdifficul-
Clarke, Cull,  D'Amato,  and Molinari ana-  ties tend not  to have participated  filly in the
lyze how foreign entry affected domestic  George  R. G.  Clarke  and Robert  Cull  Fondo  Fiduciario  privatization  program.
banks in Argentina during an especially  (August  1999)  But the privatized banks rely on their
intense  period  of  entry  in  the  service contracts with provinces  to gener-
mid-1990s.  Argentina's recentlyprivatizedprovincial  ate a big share of their income and are
Their results  are consistent with the  banks generate  much  of  their  income  having trouble making the transition to
hypothesis  that  foreign  banks  enter  through service contracts with the prov-  commercial  banking.  It  is  uncertain
areas where they have a competitive ad-  inces, and  the transition to commercial  whether the newly created banks are sus-
vantage, putting pressure on the domes-  banking has been challenging. Available  tainable. But at least a fiscal burden has
tic banks already focused on that type of  evidence suggests improvements in post-  been lifted from the provinces.
lending.  privatization performance,  but it is uncer-  This  paper -a  product  ofRegulation  and
They  find that domesticbanks with loan  tain whether these  are sustainable. At the  Competition  Policy  and Finance, Develop-
portfolios  concentrated in manufacturing  very least, however, a fiscal burden has  ment Research Group  - is part of  a larger
- an area to which foreign banks have  been lifted from the provinces.  effort  in the group to  investigate the deter-
traditionally devoted  much of their lend-  minants of  structural change in developing
ing - tended to have lower net margins  Argentina's provinces offer a unique op-  countries' banking sectors. Copies of the
and lower before-tax profits than  other  portunity to study bank privatization be-  paper are  available free from the World
domesticbanks.  The informational advan-  cause so many  transactions  took place  Bank,  1818HStreet NW,  Washington,  DC
tageslocalbanks enjoyed  probably  helped  there  in so short a period in the  1990s  20433. Please  contact Paulina  Sintim-
ensure that foreign banks would not drive  (1994-98). As the decade started,  every  Aboagye,  room  MC3-422,  telephone
them from the market.  province owned at least one bank, perfor-  202473-8526, fax 202-522-1155,  Internet
Domestic  banks with greater consumer  mance in publicly  owned provincial  banks  address psintimaboagye@worldbank.org.
lending  - an area in which foreign  banks  was substantially worse than  in private  Policy  Research Working  Papers are also
have  not beenheavilyinvolved-had higher  banks, and the losses incurred imposed  posted  on  the  Web  at  http:/www.
net margins  and greater before-tax  profits.  substantial  fiscal costs on the provinces.  worldbank.org/html/dec/Publications/12  Policy Research Working  Paper Series
Workpapers/home.html.  The authors  may  erty and Human  Resources, Development  of the good sold to the home country  and
be contacted  at gclarke@worldbank.org  or  Research  Group  - is part  of a larger  ef-  it  is indeterminate  if the  partner  is  an
rcull@worldbank.org.  (30 pages)  fort in the  Bank to inform  policy choices  exporter  of that  good.
aimed  at  minimizing  the  social  costs  of  Among Schiff's conclusions:
macroeconomic  shocks.  Copies of the  pa-  *  The home country is better  off with a
2160. Protecting  the Poor  per  are  available  free  from  the  World  large partner  country.  First,  a large  part-
from Macroeconomic  Shocks  Bank, 1818 H StreetNW,  Washington,  DC  ner  is  more  likely  to  satisfy  the  home
20433.  Please  contact  PREM  Advisory  country's import demand  at the world price.
Francisco Ferreira, Giovanna Prennushi,  Services,  room  MC3-825,  telephone  Second, the home country  is likely to gain
and Martin Ravallion  202-458-7736, fax 202-522-1135,  Internet  more on its exports to a large partner  coun-
(August 1999)  address  premadvisory@worldbank.org.  try, because  that  partner  is likely  to con-
Policy Research  Working Papers  are also  tinue  importing  from  the  world  market
To minimize  the harmful  impact  on poor  posted  on  the  Web  at  http://www.  after  formation  of the  trading  bloc. And
people  of macroeconomic  shocks,  sound  worldbank,org/html/dec/Publications/  since the partner  charges a tariffon imports
policies for dealing  with  crises - and  an  Workpapers/home.html.  The authors  may  from the world market,  the home country
adequate public  safety net - should  be in  be contacted  at fferreira@econ.puc-rio.br,  is more likely to improve its terms of trade
place  before a crisis  starts.  gprennushi@worldbank.org,  ormravallion  by selling to the partner  at the higher  tar-
Cworldbank.org.  (24 pages)  iff-inclusive price if the partner  is large.
Many  developing  countries  faced macro-  *  The  PTA as  a whole  is likely  to be
economic shocks  in the  1980s and  1990s.  better  offif each country  imports  what the
The impact  of the  shocks  on welfare  de-  2161.  Will the Real "Natural  other  exports  (rather  than  each  country
pended  on the nature  of the shock, on ini-  Trading Partner" Please Stand Up?  importingwhat  the other imports).  Losses
tial household  and community  conditions,  are similar but  less likely, while gains are
and on policy responses.  Maurice Schiff  both  more likely  and the  same  or larger.
To avoid  severe  and  lasting  losses  to  (August 1999)  This  paper  - a product  of Trade,  De-
poor and vulnerable  groups, governments  velopment  Research  Group-is  part  of a
and civil society need to be prepared  for a  Adherents  of the "natural trading partner"  larger  effort  in the  group  to understand
flexible  response  well ahead of the crisis.  hypothesis  argue  that preferential  trade  the  economics  of  regional  integration.
A key component of a flexibly responsive  agreements  are more likely to improve wel-  Copies ofthe  paper  are available  free from
system  is  an  effective permanent  safety  fare  if  participating  countries  already  the  World  Bank,  1818  H  Street  NW,
net, which will typically combine a workfare  trade disproportionately  with each other.  Washington,  DC  20433.  Please  contact
program  with  targeted  transfers  and  Opponents argue the opposite. Neither side  Maria  Kasilag,  room MC3-321, telephone
credit.  is right. The hypothesis holds up only if two  202-473-9081, fax 202-522-1159, Internet
Once  a  crisis  has  happened,  several  countries are 'natural  tradingpartners"in  address  mkasilag)worldbank.org.  Policy
things  should be done:  the sense that one country  tends to import  Research  Working Papers  are also posted
*  Macroeconomic policies should aim to  what the other exports.  on the Web at http:/lwww.worldbank.org/
achieve stabilization  goals at the least  cost  html/dec/Publications/Workpapers/
to the poor. Typically,  a temporary  reduc-  Adherents  ofthe  "natural  trading  partner"  home.html.  The author  may be contacted
tion in aggregate  demand  is inevitable  but  hypothesis  argue  that  preferential  trade  at mschifl@worldbank.org.  (25 pages)
as soon as a sustainable  external  balance  agreements  (PTAs)  are  more  likely  to
has  been  reached  and  inflationary  pres-  improve welfare ifparticipating  countries
sures  have  been  contained,  macroeco-  already  trade  disproportionately  with  2162. Quantifying  the Fiscal
nomic  policy  should  be  eased  (interest  each other.  Effects  of Trade Reform
rates  reduced  and  efficient public  spend-  Opponents  of the hypothesis  claim that
ing restored,  to help offsetthe  worst effects  the  opposite  is  true:  welfare  gains  are  Shantayanan Devarajan, Delfin S. Go,
ofthe  recession on the poor). A fiscal stimu-  likely  to be greater  if participating  coun-  and Hongyi  Li
lus  directed  at  labor-intensive  activities  tries  trade  less with  each other.  (August 1999)
(such as building rural  roads) can combine  Schiffshows  that  neither  analysis is cor-
the benefits of growth with those of income  rect. The "natural  trading  partner"  hypoth-  A general equilibrium  tax model estimated
support  for poor groups, for example.  esis can be rescued ifitis  redefined in terms  for 60 countries provides  a simple  but rig-
*  Key areas  of public  spending  should  of complementarity  or substitutability  in  orous  method  for  estimating  the  fiscal
be  protected,  especially  investments  in  the trade relations ofcountries,  rather  than  impact  of trade reform.
health  care,  education,  rural  infrastruc-  in terms  of their  volume of trade.
ture, urban  sanitation,  and microfinance.  Schiff  asks  not  whether  a  country  Using  a tax  model  of an  open  economy,
*  Efforts  should  be made  to preserve  should  form  or join  a  trading  bloc  but  Devarajan,  Go, and  Li provide  a simple
the social fabric  and build  social capital.  which partner  or partners  it should select  but  rigorous  method  for  estimating  the
* Sound  information  should  be gener-  if it does join  such a bloc.  fiscal impact  of trade  reform.
ated  on the welfare  impacts  of the crisis.  He shows  that  the  pre-PTA  volume  of  Both  the  direction  and the  magnitude
This paper  - ajoint  product ofthe  Pov-  trade  is not a useful  criterion  for select-  of the fiscal consequences  of trade  reform
erty  Group,  Poverty  Reduction  and  Eco-  ing  a  partner.  The  pre-PTA  volume  is  depend  on the elasticities  of substitution
nomic  Management  Network,  and  Pov-  equal to zero if the partner  is an importer  and transformation  between  foreign andPolicy  Research  Working  Paper  Series  13
domestic goods, so they provide empirical  contributions  will make such systems more  spouses should be incorporated into the
estimates  of those elasticities.  fiscally sustainable. But to protect the un-  pay-out phase of the defined-contribution
They also discuss the  implications  of  insured and underinsured, such programs  pillar, to keep old women out of poverty.
their analysis for public revenue.  should be complemented by better social  This paper -a  joint product of Poverty
In general,  theyfind that itmatterswhat  assistanceprogramsforlow-incomegroups.  and Human Resources, Development Re-
the values of the two elasticities are rela-  search Group, and the  Human Develop-
tive to each other. If only one of the elas-  Most old people in developing countries  mentDivision,WorldBankInstitute-was
ticities is low (close  to zero), revenue will  are uninsured  by formal social security  presented at the Inter-American  Develop-
drop unequivocally  as a result of tariff re-  programs. Economic  growth is the key to  ment Bank Conference on Social Protec-
form, reaching close  to the maximum drop  increased coverage, but policy also mat-  tion, February  4-5,  1999. Copies of the
whether or not the other elasticity is high.  ters, argues James.  paper are available free from the World
For imports to grow  and tariff collection  Contributory insurance programs may  Bank, 1818  H Street NW,  Washington,  DC
to compensate for the tax cut, the import  not work for much of the population in  20433.  Please  contactMarianne Leenaerts,
elasticity has to be high. Because of the  developing economies.  room G2-030,  telephone 202458-4264,  fax
balance of trade constraint, however, im-  Moreover,  the tradeoffs between higher  202-676-0961,  Internet address mleenaerts
ports cannot substitute for domestic  goods  take-home  pay and old-agebenefits,  between  @worldbank.org.  Policy  Research  Working
unless  supply is  able to switch toward  maximizing  coverage  and minimizing  eva-  Papers are also posted on the Web  at http:
exports. Hence,  the export transformation  sion, and between increased coverage  and  /www.worldbank.org/html/dec/Publica-
elasticity has to be high as well.  greater competitiveness,  must be carefully  tions/Workpapers/home.html.  The author
As  substitution  possibilities between  evaluated before  opting  for expanded  cover-  may be contacted at ejames3@worldbank.
foreign and  domestic goods increase,  a  age, especially  among  low-income  groups.  org. (21 pages)
tariff reform can theoretically be self-fi-  Keeping the contribution rate low and
nancing. But  if the  elasticities  are  less  including some redistribution toward low-
than  "large,"  tax  revenue will fall with  income groups  in contributory  systems  2164.  Challenging  El  Salvador's
tariff reduction and further  fiscal adjust-  may help reduce the number ofuninsured,  Rural  Health  Care  Strategy
ments will be necessary.  while avoiding costly tradeoffs.
Devarajan, Go, and Li provide empiri-  Recent years have seen a tighter  link  Maureen  Lewis,  Gunnar  S.  Eskeland,
cal estimates of the possible range of val-  between benefits and contributions in con-  and Ximena  Traa-Valerezo
ues for the elasticities of about 60 coun-  tributory systems -most  obviously  in the  And  1999)
tries, using various approaches. The elas-  shift  toward  multipillar  systems  with  (August  1999)
ticities range from 0 to only  3 in most cases  large  defined-contribution  components,  Low-skilled "health promoters"posted  in
- nowhere near the point at which tariff  usually accompanied by a modest redis-  rural villages are doing little to improve
reform can be self-financing.  tributive  public pillar. This tighter  link  health or health-seeking behaviors. In a
This paper - a product of Public Eco-  makes social security systems more fis-  supply-driven system, such workers have
nomics, Development Research Group - cally sustainable  and may be considered  too  few incentives,  too  little knowledge,  and
is part of a larger  effort in the  group to  a precondition for financially sound ex-  too little  supervision. Results can be im-
develop and apply tools to analyze fiscal  pansion of coverage.  proved without increasing costs.
reform. Copies of the paper are available  At the same time, the number of unin-
free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street  sured or underinsured (who  have contrib-  Can a  supply-driven network of under-
NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please con-  uted only small amounts) could increase,  skilled rural  health  promoters make  a
tact Hedy Sladovich,  room MC2-609,  tele-  as a result of the tighter benefit-contribu-  difference in rural health care? There are
phone  202-473-7698, fax  202-522-1154,  tion link.  few, if any, signs that  the  current  rural
Internet address hsladovich@worldbank.  The uninsured  fall into two groups:  health strategy in El Salvador is working,
org. Policy  Research Working Papers are  *  Workerswho  spend much oftheirlives  whether the health promoters are govern-
also posted  on the  Web at  http:l/www.  in agriculture or the informal sector (often  ment employees or nongovernmental or-
worldbank.org/html/dec/Publications/  self-employed  or in small firms),  injobs not  ganization (NGO)  workers.
Workpaperslhome.html. The authors may  coveredbycontributoryprograms. Many of  Lewis,  Eskeland,  and  Traa-Valerezo
be contacted at  sdevarajan@worldbank.  these workers are low earners, for whom  arrived at this  conclusion after conduct-
org, dgo@worldbank.org. (53 pages)  contributing today for potential  old-age  ing interviews and analyzing primary and
benefits may not be welfare-enhancing - secondary data.
and governments  do not have the capacity  The village-based  health promoters  lack
2163.  Coverage  under  Old-Age  to compel contributions. Social security  incentives  and  supervision,  and  ulti-
Security  Programs  and  reforms that make benefits contingent on  mately have little to offer local communi-
Protection  for the Uninsured  - contributions should include better social  ties. NGO workers  are more successful
What  Are  the  Issues?  assistance programs for these low-income  than  government workers, but  neither
groups. Efficient program design and pro-  group performs satisfactorily.
Estelle  James  gram costs must also be considered.  Even the rural poor use private services
(August  1999)  *  Women who, having worked mostly  quite intensively, despite the high cost of
in the household, expect to be supported  the services and of getting access  to them.
The shift  toward social security systems  by the family system, which may fail them  Moreover,  people  seem  to seek  the services
with a tighter link  between benefits and  in old age. Family support for dependent  they need. They select self-treatment in14  Policy Research  Working  Paper  Series
50 percent of illness episodes, with about  cities  adopted policies more consistent  the  Web at  http://www.worldbank.org/
the same success rate  as when they use  with the central government's support of  html/dec/Publications/Workpapers/
health providers.  free market reforms; most southern  (Red  home.html.  The authors may be contacted
Other options should be considered, as  Belt) cities pursued more cautious, protec-  at rhanrott@erols.com or gur.ofer@yale.
results can be improved without increas-  tive policies.  edu. (58 pages)
ing costs.  * City  governments  are  using  more
This paper - a product of the Human  proactive economic  policies,  including in-
Development Sector Units,  Europe  and  terventions to save local industries. Such  2166. Seeking Votes: The Political
Central  Asia Region and  Latin America  efforts highlight  the  dual nature  of the  Economy of Expenditures  by the
and  Caribbean  Region; and  Public Eco-  Russian  transition,  characterized  by a  Peruvian Social Fund
nomics, Development Research Group - shift in power from central to  local govern-  (FONCODES), 1991-95
is part  of a larger  effort in the  Bank to  ment  as well  as from public to private
encourage appropriate policies and pro-  enterprises.  Norbert  R. Schady
grams in the health  sector. Copies of the  * A major difficulty facing Russian cit-  (August  1999)
paper are  available free from the World  ies is the cost of subsidies to housing and
Bank, 1818  H Street NW,  Washington, DC  utilities. Real estate in general constitutes  As the literature on political influences  on
20433. Please  contact  Maureen  Lewis,  a  major  expenditure  category for local  the allocation of discretionary funds pre-
room  H7-221,  telephone 202-473-9080,  fax  government rather  than, as in most west-  dicts,  spending  by  the Peruvian Social
202-522-3665,  Internet  address mlewisl  ern cities, a major source of revenue. A  Fund,  FONCODES,  increased  signifi-
@worldbank.org. Policy Research Work-  transition in this area alone could revolu-  cantly  before  elections.  FONCODES
ing Papers are also posted on the Web at  tionize the finances and independence of  projects were also directed at provinces
http://www.worldbank.org/html/dec/  Russian cities.  where the  marginal political  impact  of
Publications/Workpapers/home.html.  The  *  Thejury is still out on what the right  expenditures was likely to be greatest.
other  authors  may  be  contacted  at  social and industrial policies  were during
geskeland@worldbank.org  or xtraavalerezo  the first years of reform.  Ulyanovsk  clearly  PresidentAlberto  Fujimori  created  the Peru-
@worldbank.org.  (48 pages)  lagged on market  reforms, and Saratov  vianSocialFund(FONCODES)in  1991with
represents a model of liberalization with-  the stated objectives  of generating employ-
out institutional  support. Both extremes  ment, helping to alleviate  poverty, and
2165.  The Russian City  have failed, but so far the social conse-  improving access to social services.
in Transition: The First Six Years  quences ofthe Saratov model appear to be  Schady  uses  province-level data  on
in  10 Volga Capitals  worse than those of the LUlyanovsk  model.  monthly expenditures, socioeconomic  in-
)  With the credibility of Russia's fed-  dicators, and electoral outcomes to ana-
Martha  de Melo  and Gur  Ofer  eral government at an all-time low,  foreign  lyze political influences on the timing and
(August  1999)  investors have no choice  but to rely on the  geographic  distribution  of FONCODES
competence  and reliability oflocal leaders,  expenditures between 1991 and 1995.
Reform in 10 regional capitals along the  especially mayors  and  governors.  They  He finds that:
Volga River is associated with favorable  will be looking  for evidence  ofaccountabil-  * FONCODES  expenditures increased
initial conditions. And  both reform and  ity in the form of the rule oflaw, and trans-  significantly before elections.
favorable initial conditions are associated  parency in the form of reliable public in-  *  FONCODES projects were directed
with  relatively successful economic out-  formation. Information at the city level-  at poor provinces, as well as provinces in
comes - except where access to  extra  often  unavailable and not easily accessible  which  the  marginal  political impact of
resources improves  outcomes or  where  - would be very useful in attracting local  expenditures was likely to be greatest.
weak government undermines success.  researchers to monitor progress (as a ba-  The results are robust to many specifi-
sis for accountability) and diagnose prob-  cations and controls. The Peruvian data
After studying the nature  and variety of  lems (as a basis for public policy debate  thus support predictions made in the lit-
transition in 10 regional capitals of Rus-  and political decisions).  erature on political  business cycles  as well
sia, de Melo and Ofer observe that:  This paper - a product of Public Eco-  as the literature on political influences on
* All cities  have experienced radical  nomics, Development Research Group - the allocation of discretionary funds.
changes in their  institutions  and econo-  is part of a larger  effort in the group to  This paper - a product of the Poverty
mies  - changes  associated on the  one  study the causes and effects of fiscal de-  Division, Poverty  Reduction  and  Eco-
hand  with the  abolition of central  plan-  centralization. The project  was carried out  nomic Management Network - is part of
ning and the introduction offreer markets,  in cooperation with  the  New Economic  a larger  effort in the  network to under-
and on the  other hand with political de-  School  (NES) in Moscow.  This is the first  stand the functioning and impact of social
centralization  and the introduction of lo-  of two papers on the Volga cities. Copies  funds. Copies of the paper  are available
cal elections.  are available free from the World Bank,  free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street
* These changes have led to a wide di-  1818 H  Street,  NW, Washington,  DC  NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please con-
versity in economic  and social outcomes,  20433. Please  contact Hedy Sladovich,  tact Norbert Schady, room MC4-629,  tele-
reflecting  differences  in  the  central  room MC2-609, telephone 202-473-7698,  phone 202-458-8247, fax 202-222-3283,
government's (inequitable) economic  rela-  fax  202-522-1154,  Internet  address  Internet  address  nschady@worldbank.
tions with regions as well as differing lo-  hsladovich@worldbank.org. Policy  Re-  org. Policy  Research Working Papers are
cal and regional policies. Most northern  search Working Papers are also posted on  also posted on the  Web at  http:/lwww.Policy Research Working  Paper Series  15
worldbank.org/htmlfdec/Publications/  mation policies  that reinforce norms and  * Returns  to  education  are  similar
Workpapers/home.html. (30 pages)  values of tolerance and diversity.  across gender, sectors, and level of union-
This paper - a product of the Poverty  ization, but they are lower for unskilled
Division, Poverty  Reduction  and  Eco-  workers than for skilled workers.
2167. Bonds and Bridges:  nomic  Management Network  - is part of  * Training supplied by outside provid-
Social Capital  and Poverty  a larger effort in the network to under-  ers (as opposed  to in-house training) is as-
stand the role of social capital. Copies of  sociated  with higher wages  but appears  to
Deepa  Narayan  the  paper  are  available  free from the  have no (immediate)  impact  on productivity.
(August  1999)  World  Bank, 1818  H Street NW,  Washing-  * Trade union members' wages are in
ton, DC 20433.  Please contact Ben Jones,  line with productivity. Both wages and
Whatever their  nature,  interventions to  room MC3-782,  telephone 202-473-9475,  productivity  are higher forunion members
reduce poverty should  be designed not  fax  202-522-3283,  Internet  address  than for non-union members.
only to have an immediate impact onpov-  bjonesl@worldbank.org.  Policy  Research  This  paper  - a  product of Human
erty, but also to foster a rich network of  Working Papers are  also posted on the  Development  3, Africa  Technical  Families
cross-cutting  ties  within  society  and  Web at  http://www.worldbank.org/html/  -is  part of a larger effort in the region
between society's formal  and  informal  dec/Publications/Workpapers/home.html.  to understand  how labor markets work
institutions.  The author may be contacted at dnarayan  in Africa.  Copies  of the paper are available
@worldbank.org.  (52 pages)  free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street
Using  the  lens  of  social  capital  - NW,  Washington,  DC  20433.  Please
especially bridging or cross-cutting ties  contact Hazel Vargas, room I8-138, tele-
that cut across social groups and between  2168. Wage and Productivity  Gaps:  phone  202-473-7871, fax 202-522-2119,
social groups and government - provides  Evidence  from Ghana  Internet address hvargas@worldbank.org.
new insights into policy design.  Policy  Research Working Papers are also
Solidarity within social groups creates  Dorte  Verner  posted  on  the  Web  at  http://www.
ties  (bonding social capital) that  bring  (August  1999)  worldbank.org/html/dec/Publications/
people  and resources  together. In unequal  Workpapersfhome.html.  The author may
societies, ties  that  cut  across  groups  Ghana's  labor  market  is segmented,  and the  be contacted at  dverner@worldbank.org.
(bridging social capital) are essential for  workforce  adds more to firm-level  produc-  (49 pages)
social cohesion  and for poverty  reduction.  tivity than its cost would suggest.  The more
The nature  of interaction between state  training and education workers hatve,  the
and  society is characterized  as comnple-  higher their wages and the greater their  2169. Corruption,  Public Finances,
mentarity and substitution. When states  productivity. In short, investments in hu-  and the Unofficial  Economy
are functional, the  informal and  formal  man capital improve  productivity.
work  well  together - for  example,  govern-
ment support for  community-based  devel-  Verner uses a unique data set (combining  Simon  Johnson,  Daniel  Kaufmann,
opment. When states  become dysfunc-  information  about  individual  workers  and Pablo  Zoido-Lobat6n
tional, the informal institutions become  a  with information about the firms employ-  (August  1999)
substitute  and are reduced to serving a  ing them) to jointly estimate production
defensive or survival function.  functions and wage equations. This ap-  In  this  sample  of 49  Latin  American,
To move toward economic and  social  proach allows her not only to assess the  OECD,  and transition economies,  it is the
well-being, states must support inclusive  marginal impact on  wages of  demographic  ineffective and discretionary administra-
development. Investments in the organi-  and other characteristics but also to com-  tion of  tax  and  regulatory regimes -
zational capacity of the poor are critical.  pare how these variables affect productiv-  not higher tax rates  alone  - as well  as cor-
Interventions are also required to foster  ity  among various  groups  of workers.  ruption, that increases  the size of the unof-
bridging ties across social groups - eth-  Among  her findings:  ficial economy.  And countries  with a larger
nic, religious,  caste, or racial groups.  Such  * Female employees  are paid less than  unofficial  economy tend  to grow  more
interventions  can stem from the  state,  male employees, but this negative wage  slowly.
private sector, or civil  society  and include:  premnium  does not reflect  commensurately
* Changes in rules  to include groups  lower productivity.  Johnson, Kaufmann, and Shleifer (1997)
previously excluded  from formal systems  * Employees' experience is  reflected  found that, in post-communist economies,
of finance, education, and governance, at  equally in wages and in productivity dif-  the unofficial economy's share of GDP is
all levels.  ferentials  over the  worker's  life cycle.  determined by the extent of control rights
* Political pluralism  and  citizenship  Wages and productivityboth increase, but  held by bureaucrats and politicians.
rights.  at a decreasing rate.  Exploring in detail the role of taxation
* Fairness before the law for all social  * The  more training  and  education  and bribery, and using data from an ex-
groups.  workers have, the higher their wages and  panded data  set of 49 Latin American,
* Availability  of  public spaces  that  the greater their productivity.  OECD,  and  transition  economies,
bring social groups together.  * Productivity differences can be dem-  Johnson, Kaufmnann,  and Zoido-Lobat6n
* Infrastructure  that eases communi-  onstrated for five  levels of education com-  find that the unofficial  economy  accounts
cation.  pleted. The productivity gap is greater  for a larger share of GDP where there is
* Education, media, and public infor-  than the wage gap.  great bureaucratic inefficiency  and discre-16  Policy Research Working Paper Series
tion, and where firmsexperience a greater  2170. The  Distributional  risk to the bank of default and would give
tax and regulatory burden, as well as more  Consequences  of Monetary  Policy:  members of the  society an  incentive to
bribery  and  corruption.  The  unofficial  Evidence  from  Malaysia  reveal infornation to the society  that they
economy  is also much larger where there  might hesitate to give to the bank.
is less state  revenue and where the rule  Ilker Domag  This paper - a product of the Poverty
of law is weak. They also find that coun-  (August  1999)  Reduction and  Economic Management
tries with a larger unofficial  economy  tend  Unit, East Asia and Pacific Region - is
to grow  more  slowly.  Thus,  this framework  Policymakers in Malaysia should weigh  part of a larger effort in the region to ana-
suggests an additional channel whereby  the distributional consequences  of policy  lyze  the patterns and consequences  of the
corruption and ineffective  regulatory and  actions. They should also consider mea-  East  Asian crisis, with particular  refer-
tax  administration  can result  in  lower  sures  to alleviate  the  disproportionate  ence to the links between the real and fi-
growth: the unofficial economy.  impact that market imperfections have on  nancial sectors. Copies of the  paper are
Wealthy OECD economies and  some  small and medium-size industries.  available free from the World Bank, 1818
Eastern European economies  find them-  H Street  NW, Washington, DC 20433.
selves in the "good equilibrium" of rela-  Domac provides a descriptive analysis of  Please contact Armanda  Carcani, room
tively  low regulatory and tax burden (not  credit and monetary policies  in Malaysia  04-015,  telephone  202-473-0241, fax
necessarily low statutory  tax rates), siz-  and investigates the distributional conse-  202-522-2751,  Internet address acarcani
able  revenue mobilization,  good  rule oflaw  quences ofmonetary policy  there by focus-  @worldbank.org.  Policy Research Work-
and  control of corruption, and  a  small  ing on small and medium-size  industries  ing Papers are also posted on the Web at
unofficial economy.  and large manufacturing firms.  http://www.worldbank.org/htmldec/Pub-
Several countries in Latin America and  Doma, suggests  that "payoff'  or "default"  lications/Workpapers/home.html.  The
the former Soviet Union exhibit charac-  risk - as captured by the spread between  author  may  be  contacted  at  idomac
teristics  consistent with a "bad equilib-  safe and risky debt  - is still well above  its  @worldbank.org.  (36 pages)
rium": the  discretionary  application  of  pre-cisis level,  underscoringthe increased
heavy regulatory  and  tax  burdens,  the  agency costs of external finance. The de-
weak rule of law, heavy bribery, and an  cline in lending activity in the first half of  2171. Productivity  Growth  and
active unofficial  economy.  1998  can be attributed to the reduced  sup-  Convergence  in Agriculture  and
In  this  large country sample  (unlike  ply of bank credit relative to demand.  Manufacturing
in the  earlier  framework for transition  Empirical  results  from  vector  auto-
economies only), the  authors  find that  regression  analysis  demonstrate  that  Will  Martin  and Devashish  Mitra
it  is  the  ineffective and  discretionary  monetary  tightening  disproportionately  (August  1999)
application of regulatory and tax regimes  affects  small and medium-size  enterprises.
in many countries - not higher tax rates  Moreover,  monetary shocks contribute  The  growth of  agricultural productivity is
by itself-  that increase the size of  the un-  substantially more  to small and medium-  widely believed to be low. But  this study
official  economy.  The tax burden reported  size firms'variance of production (71 per-  finds the  productivitygrowth rate inagri-
by firms appears to be more a function of  cent) than to that of large manufacturing  culture to be higher than that in manufac-
regulatory and bureaucratic  inefficiency  firms (30 percent).  turing, both on average and for groups of
and discretion rather  than  of tax  rates  These findings corroborate the notion  countries at different stages of develop-
alone.  that  small and  medium-size industries  ment. This suggests that a large agricul-
This paper - a product of the Gover-  face greater marketimperfections,  which  in  tural sector  need not be a disadvantage for
nance, Regulation, and  Finance Group,  turnmagnifytheeffectsofagivenpolicyshift.  growth performance - and may be an
World  Bank Institute - is part of a larger  Policymakers should weigh the distri-  advantage.
effort  in the institute to  improve  our under-  butional consequences of policy actions
standing of institutional issues and their  and should consider  measures to alleviate  Martin  and  Mitra  examine the  growth
effects  on development  and of building a  the disproportionate impact that market  and convergence  of  total factor productiv-
major new database on institutional indi-  imperfections  have on small and medium-  ity in agriculture and manufacturing in a
cators.  Copies  ofthe paper  are available  free  size industries.  large sample of countries spanning many
from the World  Bank, 1818  H Street NW,  Measures  to  alleviate  information  levels  of development over the  period
Washington, DC 20433. Please  contact  asymmetry in credit markets-including  1967-92.
Diane  Bouvet,  room  G2-136,  telephone  202-  the promotion of cooperative or mutual  There is a widely held but rarely tested
473-5818,  fax 202-334-8350,  Internet ad-  guarantee schemesfor  small and medium-  view that the rate ofgrowthin agricultural
dress dbouvet@worldbank.org.  Policy Re-  size enterprises - are one useful option.  productivity is invariably low. But Mar-
search  Working  Papers are also posted on  Groups of  firms in Southern Europe have  tin and Mitra find that the rate of  produc-
the web  athttp:/www.worldbank.org/html/  made  wide  use  of  mutual  guarantee  tivity  growth  in  agriculture  has  been
dec/Publications/Workpapersthome.html.  schemes  - usuallywithin a specific  indus-  higher than  in  manufacturing  both on
The  authors maybe  contacted  at dkaufnann  try - to provide  a privately organized 'in-  average and for groups of countries at dif-
@worldbank.org  or  pzoidolobaton  surance system'  for lending banks  that  ferent stages of development.
@aworldbankorg.  (51 pages)  allows  the banks to rely less on the assets  Martin and Mitra find evidence of high
of individual companies within the group  rates of  technical progress in both agricul-
in making loan decisions. The pooling  ef-  ture and manufacturing. At all levels of
fects of such a system would reduce the  development,  however,  technical progressPolicy  Research  Working  Paper  Series  17
appears to have been faster in agriculture  inflationary shocks.  It involved  large-scale  According  to  International  Labour
than in manufacturing. Moreover, there  borrowing abroad, but by the private sec-  Organisation estimates, roughly 250 mil-
appears to be a stronger tendency for  lev-  tor rather than the government-and  for  lion children work full or part time, most
els and growth rates of total factor produc-  the  normally well-regarded purpose of  of them in developing countries. Because
tivity to converge in agriculture  than in  funding capital investment.  most parents send their children to work
manufacturing - suggesting that inter-  It  seems unlikely that  terms  of trade  only when compelled  by poverty to do so,
national dissemination  ofinnovations has  shocks or changes in exchange rates due  one would expect an  increase in  adult
been relatively rapid in agriculture.  to pegging to the dollar could,  alone, have  wages  to reduce the amount of  child labor.
These results may well reflect the im-  caused an adjustment crisis of this mag-  But an increase in adult wages achieved
portant  investments in  agricultural  re-  nitude - although they could  have helped  through a minimum wage  law sometimes
search  and  development in  recent  de-  trigger the crisis.  has a paradoxical effect.
cades.  They also highlight the need to con-  More important, expectations of future  It can, for instance, cause some adults
tinue developing and disseminating inno-  growth in returns to the corporate sector  to be unemployed and force  them to send
vations if countries are to maintain high  began to fall. Declines  in asset valuations  their  children to work. This in turn  dis-
rates of productivity growth.  caused major shifts in investment portfo-  places more adult labor, with the result
This paper - a product of Trade, De-  lios, and the consequences of asset mar-  that more children are sent to work.
velopment Research Group - is part of a  ket shocks were compounded by second-  Basu analyzes this process with a view
larger effort in the group to understand  ary  shocks associated with  the  abrupt  to predicting the incidence of child labor.
the links between trade and growth. Cop-  shift to floating rates, concerns about the  He shows that, for appropriate paramet-
ies of  the paper are available free from the  credibility of government policies,  weak-  ric configurations, child labor may rise or
World  Bank, 18181H  StreetNW, Washing-  nessesin financial sectors, and inadequa-  fall as the adult minimum wage is raised.
ton, DC  20433.  Please  contact Lili Tabada,  cies in the mechanisms for corporate re-  This paper - a product of the Office  of
room MC3-333,  telephone 202-473-6896,  structuring  and liquidation.  the Senior Vice President, Development
fax  202-522-1159  (Internet  address  McKibbin and  Martin  use a forward-  Economics  - is part of a larger effort in
Itabada@worldbank.org).  Policy  Research  looking modeling framework to capture  the Bank to promote understanding ofthe
Working Papers  are also posted on the  some of the  major interactions between  causes  of child  labor.  The  study  was
Web at http://www.worldbank.org/htmlV  asset markets, output,  and trade in the  funded by the Bank's Research Support
dec/Publications/Workpapers/home.html.  countries  worst hit by the crisis. They  find  Budget under the research  project 'Lit-
The  authors  may  be  contacted  at  that the model is able to capture the main  eracy and  Child  Labor" (RPO 683-07).
wmartinl@worldbank.org  or  mitrad  features of the crisis.  Copies  of  the paper are available  free from
@servms.fiu.edu.  (28 pages)  This paper - a product of Trade, De-  the  World Bank,  1818 H  Street  NW,
velopment Research Group - is part of a  Washington, DC 20433. Please contact
larger effort in the  group to understand  Michelle Mason, room  MC4-338, tele-
2172.  The  East  Asian  Crisis:  the linksbetween trade andgrowth. Cop-  phone  202-473-8811, fax 202-522-1158,
Investigating  Causes  and  Policy  ies of the paper are available free from the  Internet  address mmasonl@worldbank.
Responses  World  Bank, 1818  H Street NW,  Washing-  org. Policy  Research Working Papers are
ton, DC  20433.  Please contact Lili  Tabada,  also posted  on the  Web at  http:/lwww.
Warwick McKibbin  and Will Martin  room MC3-333, telephone  202-473-6896,  worldbank.org/html/dec/Publications/
(August  1999)  fax  202-522-1159,  Internet  address  Workpapers/home.html. The author may
ltabada@worldbank.org.  Policy  Research  be contacted atkbasu@worldbank.org.  (20
The primary cause of the East Asian cri-  Working Papers  are also posted on the  pages)
sis was afundamental reassessment  ofthe  Web at  http://www.worldbank.org/htmll
profitability of investments in the region.  dec/Publications/Workpapers/home.html.
As a policy response,  temporary  fiscal ex-  Will  Martin maybe contacted atwmartinl  2174.  Prospective  Deficits
pansion generally appears preferable to  @worldbank.org.  (57 pages)  and  the  Asian  Currency  Crisis
monetary expansion or to permanent fis-
cal expansion.  Craig  Burnside,  Martin Eichenbaum,
2173.  The  Intriguing  Relation  and Sergio  Rebelo
McKibbin  and Martin identify as the pri-  between  Adult  Minimum  Wage  (September  1999)
mary cause of the East Asian crisis a fun-  and  Child  Labor
damental reassessment of the profitabil-  The  recent Asian  currency crisis  was
ity of investments in the region.  Kaushik  Basu  caused by large  prospective fiscal deficits
They identify a  number of secondary  (August  1999)  associated with implicit bailout guaran-
shocks as  well, including interest  risk  tees  to failing banking systems.  Absent the
premia, monetary expansion,  and declines  Raising adult wages  through a minimum  political will to raise taxes or cut spend-
in output brought about by failures of the  wage law can in some  circumstances have  ing, governments must resort to seignor-
financial market.  the paradoxical effect of increasing the  age revenues to  pay for the bailout of the
Unlike the Latin American crisis of the  amount  of child  labor. In  other words,  banking system. In a world of forward-
1980s,  the East Asian crisis did notreflect  using  minimum wage  legislation  as  aform  looking agents, this makes a currency  cri-
commodity  price shocks,  large changes in  of international labor standard can exac-  sis inevitable.
world interest rates, fiscal imbalances, or  erbate  problems of child labor.18  Policy Research Working  Paper  Series
Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo  argue  Blunch and Verner analyze and compare  2176.  Fiscal  Risks  and the  Quality
that the recent Asian currency crisis was  sectoral growth in three  African econo-  of Fiscal  Adjustment  in Hungary
caused by large prospective fiscal deficits  mies - C8te d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Zimba-
associated with implicit bailout guaran-  bwe - since 1965.  Hana Polackova  Brixi,  Anita Papp,
tees to failing banking systems.  They extend the classic dual economy  and Allen  Schick
They  articulate this view using a simple  model-  consisting of the agriculture and  (September  1999)
dynamic  general  equilibrium  model,  industry sectors-by  adding the services
whose key feature  is that  a speculative  sector.  Hungary's government  has  made great
attack is inevitable once  the present value  For all  three  countries,  they  find  at  progress toward revealing the true fiscal
of future government deficits rises. This  least  one  statistically  significant  long-  cost of its budgetary and off-budget pro-
is true regardless of  the government's for-  run  relationship  for sectoral GDP. This  grams, containing the financial risks ofits
eign reserves position or the initial level  indicates a  large  degree of interdepen-  policies, and improving the management
of its debt.  dence in long-run growth among the three  of public expenditures and contingent li-
The  government  cannot  prevent  a  sectors.  abilities. Although far from complete,  fis-
speculative attack but it can affect  its tim-  This  also  provides  evidence against  cal adjustment in Hungary has been  sue-
ing. The longer the  delay, the higher in-  the basic dual economy  model,  which im-  cessful not only in cutting the budget defi-
flation  will be  under  flexible exchange  plies that  a long-run relationship  cannot  cit but also in reducing  less visible aspects
rates.  exist between agricultural and industrial  of  fiscal vulnerability.
The authors present empirical evidence  output.
in support of the two key assumptions of  Analysis of the  impulse response and  The government  of Hungary  has  con-
their model:  analysis of short-run sectoral growth sup-  tained the main fiscal risks of the transi-
* Large  losses in the banking  sector  port the results on the interdependence of  tion to a market economy. It has paid off
were associated with  large increases in  sectoral growth. Both imply that  a posi-  and resolved most problems in the bank-
Asian governments' prospective deficits.  tive link exists between growth in indus-  ing and enterprise  sectors. Since 1995 it
* The public knew that the banks were  try and growth in agriculture.  has implemented fiscal adjustment with
in trouble before the currency crisis.  Their findings contradict the literature  the objective of long-term fiscal stability
This paper - a product of Macroeco-  on  the  dual  economy - and  suggest  rather  than  an immediate deficit target.
nomics and  Growth,  Development Re-  that  more  attention  should  be  paid  The main result has been pension reform,
search Group - is part of a larger effort  to intersectoral  dynamics and dependen-  which has raised temporary  deficits but
in the group to study the causes and ef-  cies  in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Why?  Because  reduced  the  long-term  public liability.
fects of currency crises. Copies of the pa-  an  adverse  shock  in,  say,  agriculture  Only the health sector awaits the reform
per are  available  free  from the  World  after a drought is likely to have an adverse  needed for long-term fiscal stability.
Bank, 1818  H StreetNW, Washington, DC  impact on other economic  sectors. Policy-  Levels  of government spending, budget
20433.  Please contact Emily Khine, room  makers  should try to accommodate not  deficits, and public service remain high,
MC3-347, telephone  202-473-7471, fax  only  the  initial  shock  in  agriculture  but  the  government  has  made  great
202-522-3518, Internet  address  kkhine  but  also  its  adverse  effects  in  other  progress  toward  rationalizing  public
iworldbank.org.  Policy Research Work-  sectors.  spending and improving the management
ing Papers are also posted on the Web at  They find that  focusing mainly on in-  of budget and off-budget fiscal risks.
http://www.worldbank.org/html/dec/Pub-  dustry  was not  optimal policy in  Cote  In the transition,  the government has
lications/Workpapers/home.html.  The  d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Zimbabwe.  For maxi-  taken on new fiscal risks - mainly state
authors  may be  contacted at  aburnside  mum economywide  growth, it would have  guarantees  and  growing  programs  of
@worldbank.org,  eichanwu.edu,  or s-rebelo  been better to balance policies to include  credit and guarantee  agencies (operating
@nwu.edu.  (51 pages)  all  three  sectors: agriculture,  industry,  on behalf of government) organized after
and services.  privatization to support, first, industries
This paper is a product of Human De-  and, later, exporters. The government has
2175.  Sector  Growth  and  the Dual  velopment 3, Africa Technical Families.  dealt with these new programs of contin-
Economy  Model:  Evidence  from  Copies  of the paper are available free from  gent government support prudently and
C6te  d'lvoire,  Ghana,  and  the  World Bank,  1818 H  Street  NW,  transparently, with reasonable ceilings  on
Zimbabwe  Washington,  DC 20433. Please contact  (and reporting of)  risks.
Hazel Vargas, room 18-138,  telephone  202-  Hungary is likely to face pressure  for
Niels-Hugo  Blunch  and Dorte  Verner  473-7871, fax 202-522-2119,  Internet  ad-  additional  spending.  Priorities in fiscal
(September  1999)  dress  hvargas@worldbank.org.  Policy  policy should include  reforming  health
Research Working Papers are also posted  financing, establishing checks on hidden
Focusing mainly on industry has not been  on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/  subsidies  in  guarantee  programs,  and
optimalpolicy in C6te  d'Ivoire,  Ghana,  and  html/dec/Publications/Workpapers/  determining  the  government's  optimal
Zimbabwe. For maximum  economywide  home.html.  Dorte Verner  may  be  con-  exposure to risk.
growth, it would have been better to bal-  tacted  at  dverner@worldbank.org. (25  In terms ofinstitutions, the government
ance policies  to facilitate growth  in all  pages)  should  aim  to create  a  more flexible,
three sectors:  agriculture, industry,  and  responsive budget  process and  greater
services.  capacity to analyze medium-term  fiscal
risks,  to build  a  more results-orientedPolicy  Research  Working  Paper  Series  19
budget  management  system,  and  to  when assessing the magnitude ofthe true  2178.  Nonfarm  Income,  Inequality,
improve  mecharisms  for  sharing  risk  fiscal adjustment and when analyzing fis-  and  Land  in Rural  Egypt
between the  public and  private sectors  cal sustainability.
under government programs.  To  the extent that explicit  expenditures  Richard  H. Adams,  Jr.
This paper - a product of the Poverty  are shifted off-budget  or replaced by guar-  (September  1999)
Reduction  and  Economic Management  antees, the achieved improvement in fis-
Sector Unit,  Europe and  Central  Asia  cal balances is overstated.  Policymakers interested in reducing pov-
Region - is part of a larger effort in the  For the  Czech Republic, adjustment  erty and improving income  distribution in
region to enhance the  quality of fiscal  may have been overstated by some 3 to 4  rural Egypt should focus on nonfarm in-
adjustment  in  countries  preparing  for  percent  of annual  GDP. A stabilization  come-which  notonly accountsforalmost
accession to the European Union. Copies  program  accompanied by a build-up  of  60percentoftotal incomeforthe ruralpoor
of the  paper are available free from the  contingent liabilities, particularly  state  butalsofavorably affects incomedistribu-
World  Bank, 1818  H Street NW,  Washing-  guarantees and obligations  to coverliabili-  tion. Nonfarm  income is an inequality-
ton,  DC 20433.  Please  contact  Alison  ties emerging from directed credit, may  reducing source  ofincome in a land-scarce
Panton, room H4-296,  telephone 202-458-  not be sustainable.  setting such as rural Egypt because  inad-
5433,  fax 202-522-2751  (Internet address  In Macedonia, the present fiscal equi-  equate land  "pushes"  poorer households
apanton@worldbank.org).  Policy  Research  librium  may be temporary  because the  out of agriculture and  into the nonfarm
Working Papers  are also posted on the  stock  of  existing  contingent  liabilities  sector.
Web at  httpJ/Awww.worldbank.orgfhtmll  could add 2 to 4 percent of GDP to future
dec/Publications/Workpapers/home.html.  deficits. And methods used to reduce the  Adams uses household-level  data from a
The  authors  may  be  contacted  at  'traditional" deficit are unlikely to be sus-  nationally representative  survey to ana-
hpolackova@worldbank.org  or  apapp  tainable without further modification.  lyze the impact of nonfarm income on in-
@worldbank.org.  (50 pages)  Brixi, Ghanem, and Islam conclude  that  come  inequality in rural Egypt. After pin-
governments:  pointing the  importance of nonfarm in-
* Must find betterways to identify and  come  to the rural poor,  Adams decomposes
2177.  Fiscal  Adjustment  evaluate  contingent  liabilities  arising  total rural  income among five sources:
and  Contingent  Government  from the banking system, nonbanking fi-  nonfarrn, agricultural,  livestock, rental,
Liabilities:  Case  Studies  nancial institutions, public  enterprises, or  and transfer.
of the  Czech  Republic  the  contingent  and direct  liabilities  of  He shows that  while nonfarm income
and  Macedonia  subnational governments.  represents the most important inequality-
* Need to better manage their risks - reducing source of income, agricultural
Hana Polackova  Brixi,  Hafez  Ghanem,  for example, building adequate  reserve  income represents  the  most  important
and Roumeen  Islam  funds and hedging risk, where possible.  inequality-increasing source.
(September  1999)  *  Should examine the implications of  A  1  percent  marginal  increase  in
the bias toward adding contingent liabili-  nonfarm  income  will  cause  the  Gini
Governments'  contingent  liabilities  in-  ties and develop  administrative reform as  coefficient of overall income to fall  by
crease  fiscal vulnerability, but are omitted  part of analyzing budget management.  12.8 percent. But a  1 percent  marginal
in traditional measures  ofthe current  deft-  This paper-ajoint  product ofthe Pov-  increase  in  agricultural  income  will
cit. In the Czech Republic this omission  erty Reduction and  Economic Manage-  cause the Gini coefficient  to rise by 15.8
may mean thatfiscal adjustment has been  ment Sector Unit,  Europe and  Central  percent. The reason for this difference  has
overstated  by 3 to  4 percent  of annual GDP,  Asia Region, and the Office  of the Senior  to do with land, which is distributed very
with future budgets having topayforpast  Vice  President  and  Chief  Economist,  unevenly in this study.
guarantees. The stock of existing contin-  Development Economics - is part  of a  Regression analysis of  the determinants
gent liabilities in Macedonia  could add 2  larger  effort in the Bank to support the  of income shows that  land ownership is
to 4 percent of GDP to that country's fu-  quality of fiscal adjustment in its  client  positively and statistically related to the
ture deficits.  countries. Copies of the paper are avail-  receipt of agricultural income but has no
able free from the  World Bank, 1818 H  statistical  relationship  to the receipt of
To control the expansion of government  Street  NW,  Washington,  DC  20433.  nonfarm income.
contingent  liabilities  and  reduce fiscal  Please contact Alison Panton, room H4-  This leads Adams to three conclusions:
vulnerability, one must be able to identify  296,  telephone 202-458-5433,  fax  202-522-  *  If policymakers are interested in re-
and measure  them. Brixi, Ghanem, and  2751,  Internet  address  apanton  ducing poverty  and improving  income  dis-
Islam discuss how this may be done and  @worldbank.org. Policy Research Work-  tribution in rural Egypt, they should fo-
demonstrate how  the assessment of fiscal  ing Papers are also posted on the Web at  cus on nonfarm income  - which not only
adjustment  may  change  substantially  http:/www.worldbank.org/html/dec/Pub-  accounts for almost 60 percent  of total
when a broader picture of government li-  lications/Workpapers/home.html.  The au-  income for the rural poor but also favor-
abilities is included.  thors  may be  contacted  at  hpolackova  ably affects income distribution.
They base their analysis on experience  Cworldbank.org,  hghanem@worldbank.  * Nonfarm income is an inequality-re-
in  analyzing  fiscal adjustment  in  the  org,  or  rislam@worldbank.org.  (41  ducing source of income in a land-scarce
Czech Republic and Macedonia.  pages)  setting such as rural Egypt because inad-
Their  work demonstrates  the  impor-  equateland"pushes"poorerhouseholdsout
tance of including contingent  liabilities  of  agriculture and into the nonfarm sector.20  Policy Research Working  Paper Series
* Agricultural income  contributes most  Providing good schools in South Asia  els  of flexibility  and  tend  to  travel  at
to rural  income inequality  because it is  could help reduce child labor and break  different times. Analyzing airport capac-
highly correlated with land ownership  and  the strong link there between poverty  and  ity  (practical  and  saturation)  under
with total rural  income.  hours spent in child labor.  peak  demand  is  essential  to  airport
This paper - a product of the Human  Data  from both countries confirm the  success.
Development Sector Group, Middle East  positive role more adult  education can  Among other important issues: Runway
and North Africa Region - is part  of a  play  in improving child welfare.  Adult  costs, level and volume of service, pollu-
larger effort in the region to identify the  education's impact on child labor is con-  tion, congestion, and air traffic control.
sources of income for the rural poor. Cop-  siderably  greater  in  Pakistan  than  in  * Recent trends in the airport industry.
ies of the paper are available free from the  Peru. One generation's lack of skills and  The  movement  toward  privatization
World  Bank, 1818  H Street NW,  Washing-  education causes the next to remain un-  may involve  public ownership and private
ton,  DC  20433.  Please  contact  Moira  educated and unskilled as well.  operation,  including  joint  ventures;
Coleridge-Taylor, room  MC3-876, tele-  This paper - a product of the Office  of  partial  or majority divestiture;  manage-
phone 202-473-3704, fax 202-522-3283,  the  Senior Vice President,  Development  ment contracts; and BOT (build-operate-
Internet  address  mcoleridgetaylor  Economics - is part  of a  larger  study  transfer) schemes and variants, including
@worldbank.org. Policy Research Work-  funded by the  Bank's Research Support  BOOT  (build-own-operate-transfer)
ing Papers are also posted on the Web at  Budget  under  the  research  project  schemes and LDO  (lease-develop-operate)
http:/www.worldbank.org/html/dec/Pub-  "Intrahousehold  Decisionmaking,  Lit-  schemes.
lications/Workpapers/home.html.  The au-  eracy, and  Child Labor" (RPO 683-07).  Or it may involve  private ownership  and
thor  may  be  contacted  at  radams  Copies  ofthis paper are available free  from  operation.
@worldbank.org.  (37 pages)  the  World Bank,  1818 H  Street  NW,  * Price regulation. Topics covered in-
Washington, DC 20433. Please contact  clude traditional  pricing  policies; price
Michelle Mason, room  MC4-338, tele-  regulation  through  an  RPI-X  formula;
2179.  How  Child  Labor  and  Child  phone 202-473-0809, fax 202-522-1158,  charges for congestion, noise, and other
Schooling  Interact  with  Adult  Internet  address  mmasonl@worldbank.  externalities;  investment  plans; and de-
Labor  org. Policy Research Working Papers are  sign of the regulatory system.
also posted on the  Web at  http/wvww.  * Regulation of quality in the industry.
Ranjan  Ray  worldbank.org/html/dec/Publications/  Topics covered: regulation of services to
(September  1999)  Workpapers/home.html. The author may  passengers  (as measured  by targets  for
be contacted at ranjan.ray@utas.edu.au.  check-in  queues,  immigration  queues,
The link between household poverty and  (39 pages)  baggage reclaim queues, concourse  crowd-
child labor is much stronger in Pakistan  ing, shopping, parking, and so on); fault
than in Peru. Providing good schools in  repair times; average levels of passenger
South Asia could help reduce child labor.  2180. Regulating Privatized  boarding and  disembarkation  and  bag-
The link  between child  labor and adult  Infrastructures  and Airport  gage  delivery;  safety;  and  investment
labor markets varies with gender.  Services  obligations.
* Performance indicators in the indus-
Using data from Peruvian and Pakistani  Ofelia  Betancor  and Robert  Rendeiro  try. Topics covered: strategic  indicators
household surveys, Ray tests the hypoth-  (September  1999)  and other financial indicators (including
eses ofa positive association  between child  revenues),  as well as indicators  of cost,
labor hours and poverty and  a negative  A background  paper for a course  on trans-  productivity, and quality of service.
association between child schooling and  port privatization  and  regulation, orga-  This paper - a product of Governance,
poverty.  nized by the World Bank Institute.  Regulation, and Finance, World  Bank In-
Both hypotheses  are confirmed using  stitute  - was prepared as a background
Pakistani  data  but  not using Peruvian  For a  World Bank  Institute  course on  paper  for the course on transport  priva-
data.  transport  privatization,  Betancor  and  tization  organized by the institute.  Cop-
What explains these divergent results?  Rendeiro  (ofthe University ofLas Palmas,  ies ofthe paper are available free from the
The link between  household poverty  Spain) cover basic issues associated with  World  Bank, 1818 H Street NW,  Washing-
and child labor is much stronger in Paki-  the regulation of privatized airport infra-  ton, DC 20433. Please contact Gabriela
stan  than  in Peru - perhaps partly  be-  structure  and services:  Chenet-Smith,  room G2-148, telephone
cause Pakistani schools are not as good  as  * Economic characteristics of airports.  202-473-6370,  fax 202-334-8350,  Internet
those in Peru, and perhaps partly because  Three types of activities are carried out in  address  gchenet@worldbank.org. Policy
Pakistani families value education less,  airports:  essential  operational  services  Research Working Papers are also posted
especially for girls. Also, Peruvian  chil-  (aeronautical  and  nonaeronautical),  on the Web  at http://www.worldbank.org/
dren combine  schoolingwith employment,  handling  services  (aeronautical  and  html/dec/Publications/Workpapers/
unlike Pakistani  children.  nonaeronautical), and commercial activi-  home.html. Ofelia Betancor may be con-
Rising wages for men significantly re-  ties.  tacted at  ofelia@empresariales.ulpgc.es.
duce the  labor hours of Peruvian girls.  Demand for basic airport  services is  (57 pages)
Strong complementarity exists between  directly influenced by trip  purpose. The
the labor market for women and that  for  two types of airline customers (business
girls in Pakistan.  and leisure travelers) need different lev-Policy  Research  Working Paper  Series  21
2181.  Privatization  and Regulation  This paper - a product of Governance,  The momentum for market and trade
of the  Seaport  Industry  Regulation,  and  Finance,  World Bank  reform appears to have stalled in some  of
Institute  - is part of a larger effort in the  the larger countries of the former Soviet
Lourdes  Trujillo  and Gustavo  Nombela  institute to increase understanding of  in-  Union:  Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine.
(September  1999)  frastructure regulation. Copies  of the pa-  Their trade  regimes are  not especially
per  are  available  free from the  World  restrictive, but weak operations in funda-
Containerized shipping has brought  pro-  Bank, 1818  H Street NW,  Washington,  DC  mental market institutions  inhibit their
found changes to maritime transport, in-  20433. Please contact Gabriela Chenet-  effective  integration into the world trad-
cluding  a shift  from  labor-intensive to  Smith, room G2-148,  telephone 202-473-  ing system. These problems,  together with
more  capital-intensive  activities.  Revising  6370,  fax 202-334-8350,  Internet address  persistent  protective pressures,  inhibit
the traditional organization of seaports  gchenet@worldbank.org.  Policy  Research  progress and accession  to the WTO.
everywhere  will prepare  ports  for a more  Working  Papers  are  also  posted  on the  The  remaining  countries  in  Central
competitive  market  and  less financial  de-  Web at  http://www.worldbank.org/htm1/  Asia, as well as Belarus,  have far to go in
pendence  on governments.  dec/Publications/Workpapers/home.html.  introducing  market-oriented  reforms  and
Gustavo Nombela may be contacted at  institutions and the kind of  trade liberal-
With  containerized shipping, maritime  nombela(empresariales.ulpgc.es.  (61pages)  ization needed for integration into inter-
transport  has changed profoundly. Among  national  trade.
other things, it has shifted from labor-in-  The  countries  of the  former  Soviet
tensive  to more capital-intensive activi-  2182.  The  Integration  Union must make most of the reform and
ties,  including larger  specialized ships  of Transition  Economies  adjustment  effort, but  WTO members
that  require  substantial  investments in  into  the  World  Trading  System  must make changes as well - especially
port infrastructure  and equipment.  the  United  States  and  the  European
Integrated  transport  chains have  re-  Constantine  Michalopoulos  Union. Both need to review their policies
duced  transport costs so much that a ship-  (September  1999)  toward  nonmarket  economies on  anti-
per may find a distant port cheaper than a  dumping practices and (in the European
closer  one. Modern  ports must be competi-  Transition  economies are  at  different  Union) on safeguards. Countries where
tive on times and prices for their services.  stages of integration into the world trad-  market  decisions prevail should not be
Seaports must be integrated within lo-  ing system. Most remaining reforms and  subjected  to nontransparent and arbitrary
gistical chains to serve their many func-  adjustments must be initiated by the coun-  procedures. In particular, countries that
tions. An efficient seaport requires infra-  tries  themselves.  But the United  States and  have been judged to be 'market"  econo-
structure,  superstructure,  equipment,  the European  Union  can help  by review-  mies in the process of gaining access to the
adequate  connections  to  other  modes  of  ing  their  policies  toward  "nonmarket"  WTO should be excluded from procedures
transport,  a well-motivated  management,  economies.  applied  for  antidumping  and  safeguard
and qualified employees.  measures in nonmarket economies.
The public  sector has been an important  Michalopoulos analyzes  current  trade  This paper - a product of the Office  of
port organizer in the  past, but  private  policies and challenges faced by the tran-  the Regional Vice  President, Europe and
participation in port operations and infra-  sition economies  - especially  countries in  Central Asia Regional Office  - was pre-
structure  could make ports significantly  the former Soviet Union - as they are  sented at the Fifth Dubrovnik Conference
more competitive.  integrated into the world trading system.  on  Transition  Economies,  Dubrovnik,
Trujillo and Nombela provide an over-  With few exceptions, transition econo-  Croatia, June  23-25, 1999.  Copies of the
view of changes in maritime activity, dis-  mies in Central  and Eastern Europe, in-  paper are  available free from the World
cuss concession contracts (a key instru-  cluding the Baltics, have been well inte-  Bank, 1818  H Street NW,  Washington DC
ment of privatization), and analyze how  grated into the multilateral  trading sys-  20433. Please contact Lili Tabada, room
regulatory mechanisms affect  such factors  tem. Their trade regimes differ  - and the  MC3-333, telephone  202-473-6896, fax
as  seaport tariffs,  port congestion, port  main challenges they face involve their  202-522-1159,  Internet  address ltabada
safety, the quality of cargo handling, and  integration into the European Union.  @worldbank.org.  Policy Research Work-
relevant  indicators  of performance, fi-  Integration  into  the  multilateral  ing Papers are also posted on the Web at
nances, and factor productivity.  trading  system,  including  progress  http:/Awww.worldbank.orglhtml/dec/Pub-
They describe how an optimal seaport  toward membership in the World Trade  lications/Workpapers/home.html.  The
system should allocate tasks between the  Organization (WTO),  varies significantly  author  may  be  contacted  at
various  institutions  involved, including  among the other countries of the former  cmichalopoulos@worldbank.org.  (38  pages)
the port authority.  Soviet  Union.  Armenia,  Georgia,  the
The degree of a seaport's decentraliza-  Kyrgyz  Republic,  and  Moldova have
tion, they conclude,  depends on  a country's  adopted relatively liberal trade regimes  2183.  Market  Discipline  and
size, the number of ports it has, and its  and are  either already  members of the  Financial  Safety  Net  Design
legal tradition.  Among several national  WTO or are close to it. These four coun-
governments  in Latin  America  - Argen-  tries  need  to strengthen  the  capacity  of  Ash Demirguc-Kunt and Harry Huizinga
tina, Brazil, Colombia,  Mexico,  and Ven-  broad market-based (especially  trade-re-  (September  1999)
ezuela  - there is an evident trend toward  lated) institutions, including customs, the
decentralization  and greaterautonomyfor  financial  sector,  and institutions  to facili-  It is difficult  to design and  implementan
port  authorities.  tate  trade.  effective safetynet  for banks,  because over-22  Policy Research Working  Paper Series
generous protection of banks may intro-  2184. Financial Services and  tion programs by precommitting to future
duce  a  risk-enhancing  moral  hazard  the World Trade Organization:  market access.
and  destabilize  the  very  system  it  is  Liberalization  Commitments  of  This paper - a product of Trade, De-
meant  to  protect.  The  safety  net  that  the Developing  and Transition  velopment  Research  Group  - is part  of a
policymakers  design  must  provide  the  Economies  larger  effort  in the  group  to advance  re-
right  mix of market  and  regulatory  disci-  search  on trade  in services.  Copies of the
pline  -enough  toprotect  depositors  with-  Aaditya Mattoo  paper  are  available  free from  the  World
out unduly  undermining  market  discipline  (September 1999)  Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington,  DC
on banks.  20433.  Please  contact  Lili Tabada,  room
Financial services negotiations  through the  MC3-333,  telephone  202-473:6896,  fax
There  has  been  little  empirical  work  on  World  Trade  Organization  have  helped  202-522-1159,  Internet  address  Itabada
the  effectiveness  of safety  nets  designed  many developing  and transition  economies  @worldbank.org.  Policy Research  Work-
for banks,  for lack  of data  on safety  net  develop more stable and transparentpolicy  ing Papers  are  also posted  on the Web at
design  across  countries.  Demirgui,-Kunt  regimes, and  their commitments  in no way  http://www.worldbank.org/html/dec/
and Huizinga  examine  cross-country  data  compromise  their ability  to pursue  sound  Publications/Workpapers/home.html.  The
on bank-level  interest  expense and deposit  macroeconomic and regulatorypolicies.  But  author  may  be  contacted  at  amattoo
growth  for evidence  of market  discipline  theAsian  andLatinAmericanparticipants,  @worldbank.org.  (53 pages)
in individual  countries.  In addition,  using  especially,  held  back on  commitments  to
cross-country  information  on deposit  in-  financial  liberalization.  And  there was less
surance  systems,  they  investigate  the  emphasis  on  introducing  competition  by  2185.  Financial  Sector
impact of explicit deposit insurance  (and  allowing new entry than on allowing (or  Inefficiencies  and Coordination
its key features)  on bank interest  rates  maintaining) foreign equity participation  Failures: Implications  for Crisis
and  market  discipline.  and protecting  the position  of incumbents.  Management
They find  that:
*  Many countries  retain  some degree of  Mattoo  analyzes  the  results  of the finan-  Pierre-Richard Agenor and Joshua Aizenman
market  discipline,  regardless  of the  type  cial services negotiations  under  the World  (September 1999)
of safety  net.  Trade Organization's  General  Agreement
*  The existence ofexplicit  deposit insur-  on Trade  in Services  (GATS).  In a country wherefinancial  intermediation
ance  lowers banks'  interest  expenses  and  He  shows  that  the  negotiations  have  is highly  inefficient  (with  the enforcement
makes  interest  payments  less sensitive  to  contributed  to more stable  and transpar-  costs of loan  contracts  very  high,  for  ex-
bank risk factors, especially bank liquidity.  ent policy regimes  in many developing and  ample), or in one experiencing  great  vola-
*  Higher  explicit  coverage,  broader  transition  economies and that  the commit-  tility and large adverse shocks in output, the
coverage,  and  the  existence  of  an  ear-  ments  in  no way  compromise  the  coun-  likelihood  of an inefficient  equilibrium  is
marked  insurance  fund increase  required-  tries'  ability  to pursue  sound  macroeco-  great. In  East Asia  it may be in the inter-
deposit  rates  and  reduce  market  nomic  and  regulatory  policies.  ests of both debtors and  creditors to collec-
discipline.  But  even  though  the  number  of coun-  tively reduce theface value of debt, to reduce
- Government  provision  of funds  low-  tries  that  participated  in  the  eventual  inefficiencies  in the financial  sector.
ers  deposit rates  but also reduces  market  agreement  was impressive,  the liberaliz-
discipline.  ing content  of commitments  was in many  Agenor and Aizenman  analyze  the impli-
*  Private  (especially  joint)  manage-  cases quite  limited.  cations  for  crisis  management  of ineffi-
ment of insurance  schemes lowers deposit  Numerical  estimates  suggest  that  in  cient  financial  intermediation  in a coun-
rates  and improves  market  discipline.  general  the  African  and  Eastern  Euro-  try  (such  as Indonesia  or the  Republic  of
This  paper  - a  product  of  Finance,  pean participants  made much more liberal  Korea) where  firms  are  highly  indebted.
Development  Research  Group  - is part  commitments  than  the  Asian  and  Latin  They base  their  analysis  on a model in
of a larger  effort  in  the  group  to  study  American  participants.  On the whole, the  which firms rely on bank  credit  to finance
deposit insurance.  Copies of the paper  are  outcome  probably  reflects  how each  par-  their  working  capital  needs  and loan con-
available  free from the World Bank,  1818  ticipant  balances  the benefit of unilateral  tracts  entail  high  state  verification  and
H  Street  NW,  Washington,  DC  20433.  commitments  against  the  benefit  of re-  enforcement  costs for lenders.
Please  contact  Kari  Labrie,  room  MC3-  taining  bargaining  chips  for  future  They  find that  higher  volatility  of out-
456, telephone  202-473-1001, fax 202-522-  multisectoral  negotiations.  put,  lower productivity,  or higher  costs for
1155,  Internet  address  klabrie  Two  aspects  of  the  outcome  cause  contract enforcement  andverification  may
@worldbank.org.  Policy  Research  Work-  concern:  shift the economy to the inefficient  portion
ing Papers  are  also posted  on the Web at  *  There  has  been less  emphasis  on in-  ofthe  debt Laffer curve - with potentially
http://www.worldbank.org/html/dec/Pub-  troducing  competition  by  allowing  new  sizable  losses in employment  and output.
Iications/Workpapers/home.html.  The au-  entry  than  on allowing  (or maintaining)  What  implications  does  this  have  for
thors maybe  contacted  at ademirguckunt  foreign  equity  participation  and  protect-  the policy debate  on crisis management  in
@worldbank.org  or h.p.huizinga@kub.nl.  ing the  position  of incumbents.  East  Asia? Debt  reduction,  in addition  to
(44 pages)  *  Where  it  was  deemed  infeasible  to  debt  rescheduling,  may be required  to re-
introduce  competition  immediately,  par-  duce employment  and output  losses in the
ticipants  have  taken  little  advantage  of  presence  of inefficiencies  in the  financial
the  GATS to lend credibility  to liberaliza-  sector.Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series  23
In practice this may be difficult to coor-  after the Mexican  peso crisis had a sizable  port-competing  sectors,  although  the
dinate  among a large group of creditors  effect  on movements  in output and domes-  move  toward  greater  openness  was
because of the free-riding problem: Each  tic interest rate spreads in Argentina.  associated with a reduction in the influ-
creditor has an incentive to refrain from  This paper - a product of Economic  ence of industrial  and  foreign-investor
offering debt relief on its own claims and  Policy and  Poverty  Reduction,  World  lobbying.
wait for  others to do so,  thereby raising the  Bank Institute  - is part of a larger effort  This paper - a product of Trade, De-
expected  value of its own claims.  in the institute to analyze the real effects  velopment Research Group-  is part of a
This paper  - a  product of Economic  of  financial sector inefficiencies.  Copies  of  larger  effort in the  group to understand
Policy and  Poverty  Reduction, World  the  paper  are  available  free from the  the political economy  of trade protection.
Bank Institute  -is  part of a larger effort  World  Bank, 1818  H Street NW,  Washing-  Copies  of  the paper are available free  from
in the institute  to explore the real effects  ton,  DC  20433. Please  contact  Tanya  the  World Bank,  1818 H  Street  NW,
of  financial sector inefficiencies.  Copies  of  Shiel, room J4-282, telephone 202-473-  Washington, DC 20433. Please contact
the  paper  are  available  free  from the  6317,  fax 202-676-9810,  Internet address  Lili Tabada,  room MC3-333, telephone
World  Bank, 1818  H Street NW,  Washing-  tshiel@worldbank.org. Policy Research  202-473-6896,  fax 202-522-1159,  Internet
ton,  DC 20433.  Please  contact  Tanya  Working Papers are  also posted on the  address  Itabada@worldbank.org. Policy
Shiel, room J4-282, telephone 202473-  Web at  http://www.worldbank.org/htm1/  Research Working Papers are also posted
6317, fax  202-676-9810,  Internet address  dec/Publications/Workpapers/home.html.  on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/
tshiel@worldbank.org. Policy Research  The  authors  may  be  contacted  at  html/dec/Publications/Workpapers/
Working Papers  are also posted on the  pagenor@worldbank.org or  j.aizenman  home.html. Marcelo Olarreaga  may be
Web at http://www.worldbank.org/html/  @dartmouth.edu. (31 pages)  contacted at molarreaga@woridbank.org.
dec/Publications/Workpapers/home.html.  (36 pages)
The authors may be contacted at pagenor
@worldbank.org  or  j.aizemnan  2187.  Who  Determines  Mexican
@dartmouth.edu. (23 pages)  Trade  Policy?  2188.  Financial  Liberalization
and  the Capital  Account:
Jean-Marie Grether, Jaime de Melo,  Thailand,  1988-97
2186.  Contagion,  Bank  Lending  and  Marcelo  Olarreaga
Spreads,  and  Output  Fluctuations  (September 1999)  Pedro Alba, Leonardo  Hernandez,
and Daniela Ilingebiel
Pierre-Richard Agenor, Joshua Aizenman,  During  a  period  of trade  liberalization  (September 1999)
and Alexander Hoffmaister  (1986-89),  when Mexican manufacturing
(September  1999)  experienced  an important inflow  offoreign  Thailand's economic crisis in 1997 was
direct investment, manufacturing sectors  fundamentally  one of  private sector debt,
A  positive  historical shock to  external  with heavy foreign direct investment re-  rooted  inprivate behavior  that affected  the
spreads can lead to an increase in domes-  ceivedgreaterprotection  in import-compet-  magnitude and composition  of investment
tic spreads and a reduction in the cyclical  ing sectors. With the move toward greater  and how it was financed. Thailand's cri-
component of output. Shocks to external  openness, the influence of industrial and  sisprovidesfurtherevidence thatfinancial
spreads immediately  after the Mexican  foreign-investor  lobbying onpolicyforma-  liberalization must be carefully managed
peso crisis had a sizable effect on move-  tion was reduced.  because,  by increasing competition,  it low-
ments in output and domestic  interest rate  ers the franchise value of existing finan-
spreads in Argentina.  Using  a  political  economy approach,  cial institutions and creates  incentives  for
Agenor,  Aizenman,  and Hoffmaister study  Grether, de Melo,  and Olarreaga analyze  unsound banking practices.
how  contagion  affects  bank  lending  the  pattern  of  protection  in  Mexico's
spreads  and  fluctuations  in  output  in  manufacturing  sector during  the period of  Alba, Hernandez,  and Klingebiel  examine
Argentina.  trade  policy  reforms  (1985-89),  when  Thailand's  macroeconomy  and  micro-
They  analyze  what  determines  bank  Mexico experienced  significant  trade  lib-  economy for the period 1988-97  to assess
lending  spreads  when verification  and  eralization  and  an  important  inflow of  the extent to which the country's mix of
enforcement  costs  for loan  contracts  are  foreign direct  investment.  macroeconomic  and  financial  sector  poli-
high.  They  take  into  account  the  potential  cies contributed  to its  economic crisis  in
They  present  estimates  of  a  vector  effect of foreign direct  investment  on en-  1997.
autoregression model that  relates bank  dogenous tariff formation.  They conclude that the crisis was fun-
lending  spreads,  the cyclical component  of  It turns  out  that  the  data  support  this  damentally  one  of  private  sector  debt,
output, the real bank lending rate, and the  analytic approach, in which the formula-  rooted in private behavior that  affected
spread in external interest rates.  tion of trade policy reflects political sup-  the magnitude and composition  of invest-
Using  generalized  impulse  response  port, and in which the presence  of foreign  ment  and  how it was financed.
functions, they show that a positive histori-  direct  investment  in the  sector  strongly  Unlike  the Latin  American  debt crisis,
cal shock to external  spreads  leads  to an  affects the pattern  of tariff  protection  be-  the  Thai  crisis  was  not caused  by exces-
increase  in domestic spreads  and  a reduc-  fore and  after  reform.  sive sovereign  borrowing.
tion in the cyclical component of output.  In Mexican  manufacturing,  especially,  Financial  sector  weaknesses  - includ-
Historical  decompositionsindicate  that  sectors  with  heavy  foreign  direct  invest-  ing  inadequate  regulation  and  supervi-
shocks  to external  spreads  immediately  ment  received  greater  protection  in im-  sion, implicit  deposit  insurance,  concen-24  Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
trated  ownership  structures,  and  poor  cial services,  including  investment  bank-  the  World  Bank,  1818  H  Street  NW,
accounting  and  disclosure  - combined  ing)  benefits  both  financial  institutions  Washington,  DC  20433.  Please  contact
with liberalization  of the financial  sector  and  consumers.  Potential  costs, such  as  Rose Vo, room MC9-624,  telephone  202-
and  capital  accounts,  increased  vulner-  extending  the safety  net to nondeposit  fi-  473-3722,  fax 202-522-2031,  Internet  ad-
ability by creating  incentives  for risk-tak-  nancial  services,  can  be  mitigated  with  dress  hvol@worldbank.org.  Policy  Re-
ing by financial  institutions,  safeguards  and  firewalls,  which  require  search Working Papers  are also posted on
Many  macroeconomic  fundamnentals  regulatory  enforcement  and  monitoring.  the  Web  at  http://www.worldbank.org/
were  strong,  but  the combination  of tight  Internationally,  countries  are moving  to-  html/dec/Publications/Workpapers/
monetary  policy  and  an  inflexible  ex-  ward  the  integrated  model.  The  wider  home.html.  The authors  maybe  contacted
change  rate  created  strong  incentives  scope ofservices  appears  to improve finan-  at  cclaessens@worldbank.org  or
for residents  to expose  themselves  to ex-  cial  stability  and  mitigate  the  risk  of a  dklingebiel@worldbank.org.  (49 pages)
cessive  foreign  exchange  and  liquidity  banking  crisis.
risks.  Degree  of  competitiveness  and
Weak corporate governance, including  contestability (openness to competition).  2190. The Credit Channel at Work:
close corporate  links  to the  banking  sec-  Competitiveness  need  not  require  many  Lessons  from  the Republic  of
tor, encouraged risky  investments  and  financial institutions; a concentrated sys-  Korea's Financial  Crisis
overdiversification  in the corporate  sector.  tem can be competitive  if contestable.  Al-
This paper  -a  joint  product  of the Eco-  lowing the  liberal  entry  of foreign banks  Giovanni Ferri and Tae Soo Kang
nomic Policy Division,  Poverty Reduction  lowers the franchise  value of(domestic) in-  (September 1999)
and Economic Management  Network,  and  stitutions,  but the evidence suggests  that
the Financial  Sector  Strategy  and  Policy  on balance  foreign entry  provides impor-  When  negative  monetary  and  financial
Department  - is part  of a collaborative  tant  benefits.  Systems  should  not  be  shocks hit the Korean  economy,  reactions
effort with  the Asian  Development  Bank  overcompetitive,  however.  They  should  in the financial  system  amplified  the im-
to understand  the management  of private  allow enough  franchise  value  that  future  pact  of the shocks  by reducing  the credit
capital  flows in Asia.  Copies of the paper  profits  give  institutions  an  incentive  to  available  and  increasing  its  cost.  This
are  available  free from  the  World Bank,  behave  prudently.  particularly  hurt segments  of the economy
1818  H  Street  NW,  Washington,  DC  Design  of safety  net. The design  of the  that  rely heavily  on bank  credit for exter-
20433. Please contact Rose Vo, room MC9-  safety  net  is  important  in  the  tradeoff  nalfinancing,  such as small  and medium-
624, telephone  202-473-3722, fax 202-522-  between  ensuring  the  safety  and  sound-  sized enterprises.
2031, Internet  address  hvol@worldbank.  ness  of financial  institutions  and allocat-
org. Policy Research  Working Papers  are  ing resources  efficiently.  A well-function-  Ferri  and  Kang  suggest  that  the  credit
also  posted  on  the  Web  at  http:l/  ing  safety  net minimizes  regulatory  for-  channel  - as  a transmitter  of monetary
www.worldbank.org/html/dec/Publica-  bearance  and gives banks  incentives  to act  and  financial  shocks  -appears  to have
tionslWorkpapers/home.html.  The  au-  prudently.  Owners  of financial  institu-  aggravated  the  Republic  of Korea's  eco-
thors  may  be  contacted  at  palba  tions behave  more prudently  if they  have  nomic crisis.
@worldbank.org,  Ihernand@condor.  much at risk,  in the form ofcapital,  future  They  use  microdata  gathered  at  the
bcentral.cl,  or  dklingebiel@worldbank.  expected  profits,  or their  own jobs.  bank  level to better  identify  this  channel
org. (61 pages)  The  wrong  safety  net,  especially  the  of transmission.  They  find that:
wrong  deposit  insurance,  entails  great  *  Monetary  tightening  broadens  the
moral hazard.  Large deposit  holders  are  spread  between  marginal  bank  lending
2189.  Alternative  Frameworks  more likely  to provide  market  discipline  rates  and  corporate  commercial  paper
for Providing  Financial  Services  if they  are  not covered  by deposit  insur-  rates  (consistent  with the hypothesis  that
ance (explicit  or implicit),  if disclosure  is  bank lending is a transmitter  of monetary
Stijn Claessens and Daniela Klingebiel  extensive,  and  if the  accounting  frame-  shocks).
(September 1999)  work  is adequate.  * Credit limits on overdrafts - arguablya
Supervision.  Best international  practice  proxy to identify shifts in the loan supply -
The  behavior  of actors  in financial  sys-  suggests  that  supervision  of the financial  react negatively to the monetary squeeze.
tems  depends  crucially  on the incentives  conglomerate  should  probably be consoli-  *  After  the  stiffening  of bank  capital
that motivate  them.  The right regulation,  dated  in one agency.  Supervisors  should  adequacy  requirements,  banks  suffering
supervision,  and  incentives  - including  have  incentives  both  to  monitor  and  to  from larger  negative  capital  shocks expe-
the scope of permissible  activities,  degree  take appropriate  action. Supervisory  sala-  rience a more marked  slowdown  in lend-
of contestability,  and extent ofthe safety net  ries should be sufficient,  relative  to those  ing and deposit-taking  and also raise their
-for  financial services can make the sector  in the private sector,  to attract  and retain  loan rates  disproportionately.
more resilient in the face of adverse shocks.  competent  and motivated  staff.  These  findings  lend  support  to the hy-
This paper  - a product  of the Financial  pothesis  that  autonomous  contraction  by
Drawing on country experience, Claessens  Sector  Strategy  and  Policy  Group  - is  banks  restricts  the  availability  of credit
and Klingebiel analyze  alternative  frame-  part of a larger effort in the group to study  and magnifies  the increase  in its cost. This
works  for providing  financial  services.  the  importance  of  the  financial  sector  phenomenon  compounded  the Korean cri-
Scope of permissible  activities.  The in-  framework  for  the  stability,  efficiency,  sis by aggravating  liquidity  constraints  for
tegrated  banking  model  (commercial  and  accessibility  of  financial  services.  most  agents  that  rely on bank  credit  as
banking  fully integrated  with other  finan-  Copies of the paper  are available  free from  their  only external  source  of funds.Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series  25
Policymakers may want to provide re-  deter both socially  desirable and undesir-  districts but the costs of financing them
lief-  possibly through market-based ac-  able forms of merger.  are spread over the entire political  juris-
tions - to the small and medium-sized  What implications do Mattoo's  findings  diction.  He formalizes  this idea in a simple
enterprises  (and other businesses) that  have for antitrust  policymakers?  theoretic framework,  in the  context of
suffer unduly from such a credit crunch.  For one thing, partial antitrust  policy  externalities between districts.
To reduce  obstacles to recovery,  they may  may lead to  less competitive  market struc-  His  main  prediction is  that  greater
also want to devise market-based incen-  tures than the total absence  of such policy,  districtingleads to  bigger  government,  but
tives to make  bank  loans available  to  because  policybarrierstohorizontalmerg-  the effects are mitigated if there are posi-
healthy firms in sectors (such as exports)  ers only  at a particular stage of production  tive spillovers of government spending
on which recovery depends.  eliminate the deterrent effectof  retaliatory  between districts.
This paper - a product of the Financial  merger. For example, if the two stages of  Institutional forms of government that
Sector Development Unit, East Asia and  production are located in countries with  concentrate  decisionmaking power can
Pacific  Region,  and Finance, Development  different  antitrustlegislation, apolicy  that  curtail the overspendingbias. He presents
Research Group  - is part of a larger effort  protects consumers  from domestic  mergers  evidence  on these predictions from  a cross-
in the Bank to study the credit crunch in  may ultimately hurt  them by rendering  section of U.S. city governments.
East Asia.  Copies  of  the paper are available  foreign mergers more attractive.  His main findings are that:
free from the World Bank, 1818  H Street  When  the equilibrium market structure  *  If we take an average city, keep its
NW,  Washington,  DC  20433.  Please  contact  does  not  contain  socially  undesirable  population and other characteristics con-
Kari  Labrie,  room  MC3-456,  telephone  202-  mergers, there is no need for antitrust  (or  stant, but divide it into a greater number
473-1001,  fax 202-522-1155,  Internet ad-  competition) policy.  of political districts, we get substantially
dress klabrie@worldbank.org.  Policy Re-  Moreover,  there may sometimesbeacase  greater government spendingper capita.
search Working  Papers are also posted on  for the  government  actually  providing  * Greater jurisdictional heterogeneity
the  Web  at  httpJ/www.worldbank.org/  supplementary incentives to  encourage  and income equality are associated with
html/dec/Publications/Workpapers/  particularformsofmerger-as,forinstance,  bigger government.
home.html.  The authors may be contacted  when  the threat ofretaliatory  merger deters  * At-large electoral  systems are not  less
at  gferri@worldbank.org  or  tkang  socially  desirable  vertical  mergers.  sensitive  to overspending than  district
@oPworldbank.org.  (25 pages)  This paper - a  product of Trade, De-  electoral systems are.
velopment Research Group - is part of a  * Strong-mayor forms of city govern-
larger effort in the group to examine the  ment, especially those in which mayors
2191.  Can No Antitrust Policy  links between trade and regulatory policy.  have veto  power, can  curtail  the  over-
Be Better Than Some Antitrust  Copies  ofthe paper are available free  from  spending bias.
Policy?  the  World Bank,  1818 H  Street  NW,  These findings are robust to controlling
Washington, DC 20433. Please contact  for socioeconomic  characteristics of cities
Aaditya  Mattoo  Lili Tabada,  room MC3-333, telephone  and to alternative  measures  of govern-
(September  1999)  202-473-6896,  fax 202-522-1159,  Internet  ment size.
address  Itabada@worldbank.org. Policy  This paper - a product of Macroeco-
Partial antitrust policy may lead to less  Research Working Papers are also posted  nomics and  Growth, Development Re-
competitive rmarket structures  than  the  on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/  search Group - is part of a larger effort
total absence of such policy. There may  html/dec/Publications/Workpapers/  in the group to study the political deter-
sometimes even be a case for the govern-  home.html. The author may be contacted  minants of government policy. Copies  of
ment  providing incentives for particular  at amattoo@worldbank.org.  (39 pages)  the  paper  are  available  free from  the
forms of merger.  World  Bank, 1818  H Street NW,  Washing-
ton, DC 20433. Please contact Suhasini
Mattoo examines how the market struc-  2192. Districts, Spillovers,  and  Devadas, room MC3-342,  telephone 202-
ture  is likely to evolve where  there  is  Government  Overspending  458-7891,  fax 202-522-3518,  Internet ad-
multistage oligopolistic  production  - and  dress  sdevadas@worldbank.org. Policy
what the implications of this are for anti-  Reza  Baqir  Research Working  Papers are also posted
trust policy.  (September  1999)  on the Web at http://www.worldbank.orgf
Mattoo treats  the  decision to merge  html/dec/Publications/Workpapers/
across or within stages of production as  Take an average city, keep its population  home.html. The author may be contacted
endogenous.  He shows thatwhen firms at  and other characteristics  constant, but di-  at baqir@econ.berkeley.edu.  (49 pages)
a particular stage of production are rela-  vide it into a  greater  number  of  political  dis-
tively dominant,  simultaneous  merger  tricts,  and you will get substantially  greater
decisions are  conducive to  competitive  government spending  per capita. Install a  2193.  Children's  Growth and
vertically integrated  outcomes,  while se-  strong-mayor  form of  citygovernment-give  Poverty in Rural  Guatemala
quential decisions are not.  the mayor  veto  power-and  you may curtail
The persistence of nonintegrated mar-  the legislature's  bias  toward  overspending.  Michele  Gragnolati
ket structures  may be explained by the  (September  1999)
existence of equally dominant firms that  Baqir considers the overspending bias in
make merger decisions sequentially. The  legislatures when the benefits of public  Research confirms that poor child growth
credible  threat of retaliatory merger may  policies are  concentrated  in  particular  outcomes in Guatemala are the result of26  Policy Research Working Paper Series
widespreadpoverty.  The better theparents'  posted  on  the  Web  at  http://www.  20433. Please contact Hafez Ghanem,  room
education  and  household  income, the less  worldbank.org/html/dec/Publications/  H4-201, telephone  202-458-5557, Internet
likely  children  are to suffer from  malnu-  Workpapers/home.html.  (49 pages)  address  hghanem@worldbank.org.  Policy
trition.  Children  also fare  better  where  Research  Working Papers  are  also posted
community  infrastructure  (such as piped  on the Web at http://www.worldbank.orgl
water  and  garbage  disposal)  and  health  2194.  Does Democracy  Facilitate  html/dec/Publications/Workpapers/
care facilities are better.  the Economic  Transition?  An  home.html.  The other authors may be con-
Empirical Study of Central and  tacted  at jdethier@worldbank.org  or ezoli
Gragnolati  investigates  the  extent  and  Eastern Europe  and the Former  Cworldbank.org.  (30 pages)
determinants  of  poor  child  health  and  Soviet  Union
nutrition  in rural  Guateinala,  as reflected
in attained  height.  Jean-Jacques Dethier, Hafez Ghanem,  2195.  Aggregating  Governance
Exploiting  a rich  data  set on relevant  and Edda Zoli  Indicators
social, economic,  ethnic,  and  geographic  (October 1999)
characteristics,  he  estimates  the  role  Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay,
played  by exogenous  individual,  house-  Empiricalanalysis  showsthatdemocracyhas  and Pablo Zoido-Lobat6n
hold, and community  covariates  in shap-  facilitated  economic  liberalization  in  25  (October 1999)
ing differentials  in children's  height.  postcommunist  countries  of  Central  and
Then he addresses  empirical  questions  Eastern  Europe  and  the  former  Soviet  With the right  method,  aggregate  indica-
ignored  in  previous  anthropometric  re-  Union. Theexistenceofavibrantcivilsociety  tors can provide  useful  estimates  of basic
search,  such  as  the  distribution  of child  at the start of the transition has the most ex-  governance  concepts as well as measures
stunting  across  communities  and  the  planatory power in this team's  regressions.  of the imprecision  of these aggregate  esti-
magnitude  of intrafamily  correlation  of  mates and  their components.
height-for-age  outcomes,  before and after  Dethier,  Ghanem,  and  Zoli  analyze
controlling  for observed  covariates.  whether  political  freedom and  civil liber-  In  recent  years  the  growing  interest  of
His  estimates  are  guided  by the  eco-  ties help or hinder  economic liberalization,  academics  and  policymakers  in  gover-
nomic model  of the  family  and the  proxi-  using  panel  data  from 25 postcommunist  nance  has been reflected  in the  prolifera-
mate  determinants  framework.  He  fits  countries  of Central  and  Eastern  Europe  tion  of cross-country  indices  measuring
multilevel  models  to hierarchically  clus-  and the former Soviet Union between  1992  various  aspects  of governance.
tered  data  to control  for family  and  com-  and  1997.  Kaufmiann,  Kraay,  and  Zoido-Lobat6n
munity  heterogeneity.  Building  on  arguments  and  counter-  explain  how a simple  variant  of an unob-
His results  confirm  findings  from pre-  arguments  put  forth in recent  literature,  served  components  model can  be used  to
vious research  suggesting  that  poor child  they  identify the  channels  through  which  combine  the information  from these  dif-
growth  outcomes  in  Guatemala  are  the  political  freedom affects economic liberal-  ferent  sources  into aggregate  governance
result  of widespread  poverty.  ization  during  the transition.  Then  they  indicators.  The  main  advantage  of this
He  finds  that  height-for-age  differen-  test  the  arguments  empirically  with  an  method  is that  it allows  quantification  of
tials between  children  of ladino  mothers  econometric  framework  that  takes  into  the precision  of both individual  sources of
and  children  of indigenous  mothers  who  account  possible  problems  with  simulta-  governance  data  and country-specific  ag-
do not  speak  Spanish  are  larger  among  neity between  the economic and political  gregate  governance  indicators.
children  of more  educated  parents  and  transitions.  Kaufmann,  Kraay,  and Zoido-Lobat6n
among  children  living  in  communities  Their  empirical  findings  clearly  reveal  illustrate  the  methodology  by construct-
with better  health  care facilities.  that  democracy  has facilitated  economic  ing  aggregate  indicators  of bureaucratic
Estimates  derived from multilevel  mod-  liberalization  in countries  of Central  and  quality,  rule of law, and graft for a sample
els reveal much clustering  of child height-  Eastern  Europe  and  the  former  Soviet  of 160 countries.  Although  these  aggre-
for-age outcomes within families and com-  Union.  gate governance indicators  are more infor-
munities.  The models account  for most of  This  conclusion  is  confirmed  under  mative  about the level of governance  than
the  community-level  variation  in  child  various  model  specifications,  for  both  any single  indicator,  the standard  errors
growth  patterns  but  explain  only half of  ordinary  and  two-stage  least  squares  associated  with  estimates  of governance
the  overall intrafamily  correlation.  procedures  and  using  two different  mea-  are still large relative  to the units  in which
This paper  - a product  of the  Human  sures  of liberalization.  governance  is measured.  In light of these
Development  Sector Unit, Latin  America  The econometric  results  reveal that  the  margins  of error,  it is misleading  to offer
and the Caribbean  Region - is part  of a  existence  of a vibrant  civil society  at  the  very precise rankings  of countries  accord-
larger  effort in the region to study  poverty  start  of the transition  has the most explana-  ing to their  level of governance:  small  dif-
and human  development  indicators.  Cop-  tory power in the  authors'  regressions.  ferences  in country  rankings  are unlikely
ies of the paper are available  free from the  This paper  - a product  of the  Poverty  to be statistically  - let alone  practically
World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washing-  Reduction  and  Economic  Management  - significant.  Nevertheless,  these  aggre-
ton,  DC  20433.  Please  contact  Michele  Sector  Unit,  Europe  and  Central  Asia  gate  governance  indicators  are useful  be-
Gragnolati,  room  17-040,  telephone  Region - was  presented  at  a seminar  at  cause they allow countries to be sorted into
202-458-5287,  fax 202-522-0050, Internet  the World Bank in April 1999. Copies ofthe  broad  groupings according to levels of gov-
address  mgragnolati@worldbank.org.  paper  are  available  free  from  the  World  ernance,  and they can be used to study the
Policy Research  Working Papers  are also  Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington,  DC  causes  and consequences  of governance  inPolicy Research Working Paper Series  27
a  much larger  sample of countries than  This paper - a joint product of Macro-
previously used (see for example the com-  economics  and Growth, Development  Re-
panion paper by Kaufinann, Kraay, and  search Group; and Governance, Regula-
Zoido-Lobat6n, "Governance  Matters,"  tion, and Finance, World Bank Institute
Policy  Research Working  Paper 2196).  -is  part of a larger effort in the Bank to
This paper - a joint product of Macro-  study the causes and consequences of  gov-
economics  and Growth, Development Re-  ernance  for development. Copies of the
search Group; and  Governance, Regula-  paper are available free from the World
tion, and Finance, World Bank Institute  Bank, 1818  H Street NW,  Washington, DC
-is  part of a larger effort in the Bank to  20433.  Please contact Diane Bouvet,  room
study the causes and consequences of  gov-  G2-136,  telephone  202-473-5818, fax
ernance  for development. Copies of the  202-334-8350,  Internet  address dbouvet
paper  are available free from the World  @worldbank.org. Policy Research Work-
Bank, 1818  H Street NW,  Washington,  DC  ing Papers are also posted on the Web at
20433.  Please contact Diane Bouvet, room  http://www.worldbank.org/html/dec/Pub-
G2-136,  telephone 202-473-5818,  fax 202-  lications/Workpapers/home.html.  The
334-8350,  Internet  address  dbouvet  authors may be contacted at dkaufmann
@worldbank.org.  Policy  Research  Working  @worldbank.org,  akraay@worldbank.org,
Papers are also posted on the Web at http:/  or  pzoidolobaton@worldbank.org.  (60
/www.worldbank.org/html/dec/Publica-  pages)
tionstWorkpapers/home.html.  The authors
maybe contacted  atdkaufmann@worldbank.
org,  akraay@worldbankorg,  orpzoidolobaton
@worldbank.org.  (39 pages)
2196.  Governance  Matters
Daniel Kaufinann, Aart Kraay,
and Pablo Zoido-Lobat6n
Six  new aggregate measures capturing
various dimensions ofgovernanceprovide
new evidence of a strong causal relation-
ship from better governance to better de-
velopment outcomes.
In a cross-section of more than  150 coun-
tries,  Kaufmann,  Kraay,  and  Zoido-
Lobat6n provide new empirical evidence
of a strong causal relationship  from bet-
ter governance to better development out-
comes.  They base their analysis on a new
database  containing more than  300 gov-
ernance indicators compiled from a vari-
ety of sources.  They provide a detailed
description  of each  of these  indicators
and sources. Using an unobserved compo-
nents  methodology  (described  in  the
companion paper by Kaufmann, Kraay,
and Zoido-Lobat6n,  "Aggregating Gover-
nance Indicators," Policy  Research Work-
ing Paper 2195), they then  construct six
aggregate indicators corresponding to six
basic  governance  concepts: voice  and
accountability,  political instability  and
violence,  government  effectiveness,
regulatory burden, rule of law, and graft.
As  measured  by  these  indicators,
governance  matters  for  development
outcomes.